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Abstract 
The moderation function of in-group status position on the relationship between group-based 
guilt and reparation intention was tested in a 2 (group-based guilt: low versus high) x 2 (status 
loss: weak versus strong) factorial between-subjects design, using an online survey software 
program named Qualtrics. The target population was white South African undergraduate 
students born after 1988 and registered at the University of South Africa.  The results of the 
first Experiment confirmed the hypothesis, that the relationship between group-based guilt and 
reparation intention becomes less significant the more participants perceive a loss of status for 
their in-group.  However, the hypothesis could not be confirmed in Experiment 2.  The results 
are presented and discussed in detail.  
Keywords: Reparation intention, group-based guilt, judgment bias, in-group status position. 
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Introduction 
Intergroup harm doing seems to be a global phenomenon spanning across the age 
of time (Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). Historical examples representing the savagery 
and sometimes hostile treatment of one group towards another include, but is not limited 
to, the Holocaust with an estimated 10 to 17 million people slaughtered  (Naik, 2010); the 
enslavement of indigenous peoples via colonization (see Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & 
Manstead, 1998, 2006; Henry, 2003; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Paez, Marques, 
Valencia, & Vincze, 2006; Swim & Miller, 1999); South Africa’s apartheid (see 
Klandermans, Werner, & van Doorn, 2008; Vice, 2010); and the more recent Rwandan 
genocide with approximately one million Tutsi’s and moderate Hutu’s killed in a period 
spanning one-hundred days (Rosenberg, n.d).  Gender-based inequality (see Schmitt, 
Branscombe, & Brehm, 2004), and religious inequality (Zonszein, 2014), where one 
group benefits from the illegitimate treatment of another group comprise some recent 
examples of ongoing inequality and hostile treatment.  
In the aftermath of mass trauma and violence both restitution and reconciliation 
are important strategies for the future peaceful relationships between previously 
conflicting groups. Reparation in general and intergroup reparation in particular play an 
important role in the achievement of restitution and reconciliation.  Reparation has pro-
social implications for intergroup relations and could be a first step in repairing damaged 
intergroup relationships (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004).   
Social psychological research, conducted within  social contexts where the former 
transgressor group remained in a high status position relative to the former victimized 
group, has shown that group-based guilt and reparation are positively related (Doosje et 
al., 1998, 2006; Gunn & Wilson, 2011; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Klandermans et al., 
2008; Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005; Paez et al., 2006; Sheikh & 
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Janoff-Bulman, 2010; Tangney, 1991; Tracy & Robins, 2006; Wohl et al., 2006).  
However, this positive relationship becomes seemingly less significant within the context 
of social change as demonstrated by Dumont and Waldzus (2014).   
It is known from research that social change is perceived as threatening and 
affects out-group attitudes and intergroup help (Nadler & Halabi, 2006).  In this instance, 
if a loss of status is perceived, previous transgressor groups will not extend a helping 
hand aimed at reparation.  This would imply that previous transgressor groups will only 
be prepared to pay reparation if their dominant position is retained but would be less 
willing to do so when their dominant position is poised to change.  If this is the case it 
would seem that reparation is reduced to a financial phenomenon (e.g., pay because we 
can as opposed to not paying because of a perceived loss of status position and therefore 
have already paid).   
Research on reparation within the context of social change, where the former 
transgressor group is no longer in a high status position, seems to be somewhat scarce and 
the existing research is based on correlative rather than experimental research design 
(Dumont & Waldzus, 2014).  Therefore the present research is aimed at extending our 
understanding of the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation support by 
conceptualising social change as a condition that moderates this relationship and by 
testing this moderation function using a more controlled research design. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Literature Review 
Guilt is a psychologically adaptive self-conscious, self-focused evaluating 
distress-based emotion albeit unpleasant and negative, and involves a sense that another 
individual was illegitimately harmed (Lewis, 2011; Miron, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 
2006; Orth, Robins, & Soto, 2010; Wohl et al., 2006). Perceiving the self as responsible 
for harm doing against an underserving other, may result in the experience of guilt at the 
individual level (see Doosje et al., 1998; Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & 
Barlow, 1996). From an attribution perspective, following an outcome appraisal and 
immediate emotional reaction (e.g., to be happy or sad), a causal attribution will be 
sought along the dimensional pathway of stability, locus of causality and controllability 
(Wiener, 1985).  Guilt seems to be associated with the dimension of controllability (Tracy 
& Robins, 2006; Weiner, 1985) and involves an internal specific self-attribution where 
the negative event is attributed to an actor’s behaviour (e.g., this thing happened because 
of my behaviour). Because behaviour is under the control of the actor, there is a 
perception that the harmful action/s committed against another person could have been 
avoided (Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen, 2004).  
Similarly, Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavanski (1994) indicated that the 
counterfactual thought of how a person could have avoided a situation by behaving in a 
different manner is associated with feelings of guilt.  From a counterfactual perspective, 
generating possible alternatives to reality, as response to a transgression, involves a 
mental “mutation” of the event, whereby a different value is assigned to the situation 
resulting in a belief that the situation could have been changed or undone (Niedenthal et 
al., 1994, p. 585).  In the same vein, Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton (1994) 
indicated that guilt could be experienced because of a feeling of distress that is elicited 
due to an action which was under the control of the actor that caused harm to another.     
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However, the experience of guilt are not only limited to situations where the 
personal self is implicated coupled with perceived responsibility for harmful actions 
committed against another person.  Guilt may also be experienced at the group level when 
the group to which a person belongs to, has engaged in, or is currently engaging in 
behaviour which is perceived as illegitimate by other in-group members and which 
undermines the internalised collective values of that group (Wohl et al., 2006, p. 1). 
According to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), part of an 
individual’s self-concept is derived from the knowledge that a person is a member of 
a/many social group/s.  Individuals derive meaning from their social environment by 
categorising themselves and others into groups (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987), and as the group becomes more important to the self and group values 
are internalised, the emotional investment in that group is enhanced. Therefore it is likely 
that emotions derived from that specific group membership may be experienced (Mackie, 
Smith, & Ray, 2008).  An individual may identify more with one group than another and 
therefore the emotional investment within the group will depend on the degree of 
identification (e.g., high versus low) or affective attachment to the group (Lickel, 
Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004).  Being part of the group has implications on the way a 
person may behave, feel and think especially if a person identifies strongly with a group 
(e.g., high identifier; see Mackie et al., 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). However, when an 
individual has categorised himself or herself as a member of a group and that specific 
group has behaved in an immoral manner, either in the past or at present still engages in 
immoral behaviour, depending on certain conditions, guilt at the group level may be the 
resultant emotion. 
Research by Doosje et al. (1998) indicated that individuals may experience guilt 
on behalf of their group (the group with which the individual has identified) even if those 
 
 
11 
 
who are experiencing the emotion were not personally involved at the time when the 
transgression was committed.  In this seminal work, Doosje et al. (1998) postulated that 
guilt could be experienced at group level upon reflecting on the negative past behaviour 
of other in-group members (e.g., white Afrikaner South Africans towards black South 
Africans).  Doosje et al. (1998) argued that people tend to categorise themselves into 
groups as a way of making sense of the social world and of themselves within the world.  
By doing this they emphasise the group component of their self-image.  Therefore it is 
possible to experience specific emotional reactions (e.g., guilt) because of the actions of 
that group.  Based on these assumptions, Doosje et al. (1998), tested in two social 
psychological experiments, whether group-based guilt could be experienced. 
The first experiment used artificially created groups, followed by another study 
which was conducted in the field with focus on natural groups.  In both these studies, the 
feeling of group-based guilt was induced by making the negative history of one’s group 
salient.  This was done either by manipulating the actual past or historic behaviour of the 
in-group towards an out-group or by manipulating the perceptions of the past or historic 
behaviour of the in-group. The questions addressed were whether the feeling of group-
based guilt was experienced by the participants and whether this feeling would result in 
reparative actions in order to restore the relationship between the victim and the 
transgressor group.  To belong to a certain group (e.g., white Afrikaner) is likely to elicit 
certain emotional responses when the in-group’s history of harm is made salient (e.g., 
apartheid).  It is likely that some individuals may experience guilt even though the 
personal self was not involved or could not have been involved (e.g., the born-free 
generation of South Africa).  The focus of Doosje et al.’s (1998) research was therefore 
placed on how group members reacted when their group’s negative history was made 
salient, emphasising the reactions of individual group members who could not have 
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contributed personally to their group’s history.  Although Doosje et al. (1998) did 
acknowledge theories of emotions in that guilt could only be experienced for actions for 
which the self is deemed as having been responsible, their research clearly indicated that 
personal responsibility in the legal sense was not a necessary prerequisite for guilt to be 
experienced. Indeed, the results of the first study showed that by portraying a group as 
having mistreated another group in the past could induce group-based guilt which is 
different and distinct from personal guilt.  
It is within this framework that group-based guilt is defined as guilt that is 
experienced (either indirectly or as a second-hand emotion) at group level in response to 
immoral harm and/or transgressions committed, where the larger in-group (e.g., current 
in-group) is connected to the wrongdoing via shared identity (Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer, 
Leach, & Pedersen, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).   
According to Baumeister et al. (1994, p. 247) guilt serves three functions: first, it 
enhances “relationship-enhancing patterns of behaviour”; secondly, it may serve as a 
motivator to restore a sense of power for a victimised group member; and lastly to 
“redistribute emotional distress”.  Albeit from an interpersonal perspective, these notions 
have been reflected at an intergroup level as well. Group-based guilt is associated with 
reparative behaviour aimed of restoring a damaged intergroup relationship (Branscombe 
& Doosje, 2004; Doosje et al., 1998).  Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, and Carmi 
(2009) have indicated that victimised group members have an emotional need to restore a 
sense of power.  This could be done by not providing forgiveness to the transgressor 
group because refusal is a way of establishing power in the victim-transgressor 
relationship.   Group-based guilt also serves a function for the victimised group as 
demonstrated by Dumont and Waldzus (under review, p. 8).  The authors argued that 
group-based guilt could fulfil the victimised group members’ reconciliation needs “as far 
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as those emotions contributed to the victimised group’s reintegration and recognition in a 
larger moral community”.  And lastly, the redistribution of emotional distress pertains to 
the restoration of emotional inequity. Because group-based guilt is associated with 
feelings of distress caused by harmful acts to undeserved others and inequality based on 
illegitimate advantages obtained at the expense of low status non-dominant group 
members, transgressor group members may experience negative affect including reduced 
enjoyment of illegitimately obtained benefits (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; Miron et 
al., 2006).  In this sense, negative affect is restored to the transgressor group who caused 
negative feelings in the victimised group in the first place (Baumeister et al., 1994). 
Group-based guilt is indicative that responsibility has been taken for the immoral 
act and that the transgressor group is ready to engage in reparative behaviour.  Although 
the research by Doosje et al. (1998) indicated that personal responsibility in the legal 
sense is not a prerequisite for the experience of group-based guilt, it does not imply that 
responsibility may be negated for transgressions committed by fellow in-group members.  
The current in-group who are connected to the transgression via a shared group identity 
must assume responsibility for the wrongdoing in order that group-based guilt will be 
experienced (Branscombe, 2004; Cehajic & Brown 2010; Cehajic, Brown, & Gonzalez, 
2009; Iyer et al., 2004; Leach, Zeineddine, & Cehajic–Clancy, 2013; Wohl et al., 2006).  
In addition to accepting responsibility for the transgression, there are two other proximal 
antecedent conditions and one distal antecedent condition that serve as basis for the 
experience of group-based guilt (Branscombe, 2004).  These antecedent conditions will 
now be discussed to illustrate their importance.   
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Antecedents of group-based guilt 
Branscombe (2004) indicated that there are three main proximal antecedent 
conditions that must be present in order for group-based guilt to be experienced as well as 
a distal antecedent termed in-group identification.  The three proximal antecedents 
include, firstly the degree of in-group responsibility for the immoral act/s committed; and 
secondly the transgression must be perceived as illegitimate and thirdly the perceived cost 
of achieving a relationship must be characterised as just.  Branscombe (2004) also 
indicated that the antecedents of group-based guilt also depend on a shared group 
membership and shared identity. 
Similarly, Wohl et al. (2006, p. 9) indicated that there are four main antecedent 
conditions that must be present in order for group-based guilt to be experienced.  These 
include, (1) assuming responsibility for fellow-group members immoral and illegitimate 
actions (2) a shared identity, (3) the perceived cost of making amends and (4) 
categorising the self with the group that committed the transgression.   
The question that arises is “How can current in-group members take responsibility 
for transgressions committed in the past if they had no control over the outcome at that 
time?” In response to this, Lickel et al. (2004) indicated that responsibility must be taken 
for dealing with the current repercussions of past harmful acts with attempts aimed at 
redressing the imbalance of inequality.  Acknowledging that one’s group is responsible 
for committing an immoral act that has resulted in the in-group’s advantaged position, at 
the expense of another is not an easy thing to do.  By default, aligning oneself with an 
identified group over that of another group will facilitate the application of fair treatment 
towards other in-group members as well as engaging in group serving attributions that 
tend to favour the in-group (Pettigrew, 1998).  However, by taking responsibility for 
 
 
15 
 
fellow in-group members’ immoral acts, a psychological bond is formed between the self 
and the immoral act (Branscombe, 2004), which morally obliges one to make reparation. 
Experiencing group-based guilt is negative in nature because it affects an 
individual’s striving for a positive social identity, especially those that identify highly 
with their group.  To protect social identity from threat, an individual will attempt to 
employ various strategies to inhibit the experience of group-based guilt in order to 
enhance positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).   
Protective strategies aimed at deflecting responsibility for transgression/s 
committed may include the following: (1) denial or dissociation of events; (2) the harmed 
group could be blamed for the transgression and/or (3) the responsibility of the 
transgression will be placed on a few deviant group members who are not representative 
of the whole in-group (Wohl et al., 2006).  By distancing themselves from the harm 
committed, in-group members may place the focus on out-group disadvantage rather than 
in-group advantage or illegitimate privilege obtained from harmful acts committed.  By 
focusing on the out-group regarding disadvantage, the chances are that the perceptions of 
responsibility from the in-group’s perspective is diminished which tends to result in 
significantly lower feelings of group-based guilt (Wohl et al., 2006).  A study conducted 
by Miron et al. (2006), demonstrated that the experience of group-based guilt was 
enhanced when inequality was phrased as illegitimate.  In this particular study the distress 
levels of in-group members was elevated by presenting them with negative information 
regarding past behaviour towards the out-group.  The in-group’s privileged position at the 
expense of out-group members was made salient which resulted in the acceptance of 
responsibility thereby setting the groundwork for the experience of group-based guilt.   
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Another strategy to negate responsibility for past transgressions committed by the 
in-group includes blaming the out-group for past wrongdoing/s.  Blaming the victim 
group for the transgression/s committed, not only assists the transgressor group in feeling 
better about the past but also alleviates feelings of group-based guilt (Cehajic et al., 
2009).  Based on Bandura’s (1999) theory of moral disengagement strategy, Cehajic et al. 
(2009), referred to taking the moral disengagement path whereby group members 
belonging to a group which has harmed another group defend their joint group identity by 
de-humanising the victim group. Dehumanisation refers to ascribing non-human 
characteristics to an out-group (e.g., animal or mechanistic characteristics), thereby 
stripping the out-group of human-like qualities or the “essence” that makes the out-group 
human (Capozza, Andrighetto, Di Bernardo, & Falvo, 2012; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, 
Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007, p. 142).  Cehajic et al. (2009) argued that by dehumanizing the 
victimised group, the in-group avoids experiencing empathy for the suffering of out-
group members and in the process be absolved from experiencing any moral dilemma.    
Wohl, Hornsey, and Bennet (2012) have indicated that infra-humanisation is more 
subtle than dehumanisation, with the former not equating humans with animals or robots 
as in the case with the latter.  Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) indicated that in the event 
that the in-group is presented with negative information of past transgressions committed, 
the in-group will infra-humanise the out-group in an attempt to alleviate feelings of 
wrongdoing.  Infra-humanisation is associated with the idea that only humans can 
experience secondary emotions (e.g., hope, love and guilt; see Capozza et al., 2012).  In 
this instance the out-group will be perceived as less human and incapable of experiencing 
secondary emotions like love.  Categorising the out-group as less human consequently 
results in feeling less empathy and/or sympathy for the out-groups’ plight, which, on the 
one hand, absolves in-group members of moral troubles and, on the other hand, protects 
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their group-identity.  Similarly, another group-protective strategy could be to apply in-
group humanising biases where transgressions could be perceived as due to human error 
rather than due to a dysfunctional moral compass (Koval, Laham, Haslam, Bastian, & 
Whelan, 2012).   
However, research conducted by Bastian, Jetten, Chen, Radke, Harding, and 
Fasoli (2013) indicated that transgressor group members may self-dehumanise following 
a transgression characterised as immoral.  In such an instance transgressor group 
members may reflect on their own humanity and may appraise their humanity as wanting.  
In order to restore the imbalance they may be motivated to engage in behaviour that 
reflects atonement.  This demonstration may then reconnect the transgressor group with 
“their human community” (Bastian et al., 2013, p. 158).   
Finally, in an attempt to negate responsibility for past wrongdoing, in-group 
members may place the blame on a few deviant “scapegoat” members (Wohl et al., 2006, 
p. 13).  Especially if the in-groups’ history is perceived as negative, high in-group 
identifiers may deem the in-group as more variable as opposed to low in-group identifiers 
(Doosje & Branscombe, 2003).  In this instance the negative characteristics regarding past 
transgressions is not extended to the whole group and therefore the positive 
distinctiveness of the group remains intact (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).  
The second antecedent to the experience of group-based guilt is acknowledging 
that the transgression is/was illegitimate and immoral (Branscombe, 2004; Wohl et al., 
2006).  Appraisals concerning illegitimate advantages that in-group members possess at 
the expense of out-group members do seemingly enhance the experience of group-based 
guilt (see Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008; Miron et al., 2006; Powell, Branscombe, & 
Schmitt, 2005; Swim & Miller, 1999; Vice, 2010; Wohl et al., 2006). Miron et al. (2006) 
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demonstrated that when in-group members are presented with information regarding 
illegitimate inequality, distress will be experienced, especially if the intergroup inequality 
is perceived as unjust.  Distress is experienced when one perceives that the ratio of inputs 
as opposed to outputs is unequal (e.g., benefits received by the in-group far outweigh the 
inputs invested; see Powell, et al., 2005).  If in-group members perceive the injustice to 
benefit their own group at the expense of the out-group, greater distress will be 
experienced and may result in feelings of group-based guilt.  In Study 2, Miron et al. 
(2006) manipulated perceptions of legitimacy concerning gender inequality.  If the out-
group’s disadvantage was appraised as legitimate, the experience of group-based guilt 
was diminished. However, if the out-group’s disadvantage was appraised as illegitimate, 
in-group members tended to experience more group-based guilt.  The results in the study 
also indicated that any perceived doubt concerning illegitimacy appraisals regarding the 
out-group’s disadvantage, will result in legitimising the disadvantage and in the process 
negate the experience of group-based guilt.  Similar results were obtained by Doosje et al. 
(1998).  In line with Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), individuals who tend 
to identify highly with their in-group will be motivated to view their group in a positive 
way as a means of enhancing the group’s positive distinctiveness as well as their personal 
self-esteem.  In the event that this particular identity is threatened, high identifiers will 
especially be motivated to legitimize the in-group’s actions because by doing this the 
positive distinctiveness of the in-group remains unchanged and the social identity stays 
intact.   Legitimacy appraisals of inequality serve as a deterrent to the experience of 
group-based guilt via the reduced experience of distress (Miron et al., 2006).   
Legitimising actions may include perceiving that the out-group was the cause of 
the in-group’s actions and therefore deserved the unfair treatment that was bestowed upon 
them (Wohl et al., 2006).  Other legitimizing actions could include minimising the harm 
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done and/or rationalising the harmful event as just because it was done in service to a 
higher ideology (Branscombe & Miron, 2004).  In an attempt to avoid the negative 
emotion of group-based guilt, the in-group could perceive the transgression as an act of 
liberation in an attempt to morally justify or exonerate the particular group’s actions 
(Figueiredo, Valentim, & Doosje, 2011). Research conducted by Brown and Cehajic 
(2008) indicated that a common strategy employed by in-group members to avoid 
negative affect, is to perceive their own victimhood in conflict situations.  By morally 
justifying or legitimizing past wrongdoing, even when responsibility cannot be denied, no 
wrongdoing is perceived on the part of the in-group and consequently the in-group’s 
social identity stays intact (Branscombe & Miron, 2004). 
Another antecedent that facilitates the experience of group-based guilt includes 
the perceived cost of the reparation itself (Wohl et al., 2006).   A study conducted by 
Schmitt et al. (2004) showed that the experience of group-based guilt is impeded if the 
difficulty and/or implied cost of reparation extend the effort thereof.  The incentive to 
motivate in-group members to engage in reparation and by implication the experience of 
group-based guilt, will be more likely if the damage is perceived as moderately difficult 
to repair (Wohl et al., 2006).  The perceived cost of repairing the damage done must not 
outweigh the importance of doing so as this will undermine the experience of group-
based guilt (Schmitt et al., 2004; Wohl et al., 2006). 
Branscombe (2004) suggested that in-group identification represents a distal 
antecedent that indirectly impacts or mediates the experience of group-based guilt 
through its influence on the three proximal antecedents as discussed.  In-group 
identification is defined by Lickel et al. (2004), as the degree of value or attachment 
placed in a shared identity.  Group-identification indirectly predicts the degree of 
conformity with group norms (e.g., high identifiers uphold group norms, low identifiers 
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are not too concerned with group norms), emotions about immoral group behaviour (e.g., 
high identifiers tend to experience less group-based guilt as opposed to low identifiers), 
differences in group serving interpretations of immoral group behaviour (e.g., high 
identifiers engage in group-serving attributions as opposed to low identifiers who do not) 
as well as the manner in which group members deal with past behaviour (Doosje et al., 
2006).  
The literature presents a distinction between dimensions of identification that are 
considered when studied in the context of group-based guilt.  Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan 
(2004), for instance, have indicated that the relationship between group identification and 
group-based guilt is dependent upon the form of identification.  The authors differentiated 
between in-group glorification and attachment.  In-group glorification is characterised by 
a perception that the in-group is more worthy than the out-group.  In-group attachment, 
on the other hand, is characterised by assuming a critical stance when focusing on in-
group practises in addition to a perception of worthiness (Roccas et al., 2004).  The 
difference lies therein that when the self’s identity is questioned in a group context 
regarding perceptions of transgressions, in-group members will probably engage in 
behaviour that absolves other fellow group members’ actions.  The latter may enhance 
critical thinking on the part of in-group members to judge behaviour in an objective way 
and pave the way for taking responsibility for other in-group members’ actions.  This has 
important implications for the experience of group-based guilt, because if in-group 
members can critically judge fellow in-group members’ actions in an objective way for 
past transgressions committed, taking responsibility for actions is a perceivable 
possibility which forms the basis of the experience of group-based guilt (Wohl et al., 
2006).  Whereas Roccas et al. (2004) referred to in-group glorification and in-group 
attachment to denote in-group identification, other authors like Doosje et al. (1998; 2006) 
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as well as Dumont and Waldzus (2014) referred to a degree or level of in-group 
identification (e.g., low and high), in their respective studies.  
Research conducted by Leach, van Zomeren, Zebel, Vliek, Pennekamp, Doosje, 
Ouwerkerk, and Spears (2008), indicated that in-group identification is a two-
dimensional, multi-component concept.  The general dimension of group-level self-
definition consists of the two distinct components namely, individual self-stereotyping 
and in-group homogeneity.  The second general dimension of self-investment comprises 
satisfaction, solidarity and centrality.  The component individual self-stereotyping refers 
to the tendency to stereotype oneself as similar to the group with whom an individual is 
associating the self.  Leach et al. (2008) reasoned that by self-stereotyping with the in-
group, in-group members will have an emotional bond with the respective group and 
therefore share in-group successes and failures.  Leach et al. (2008) stipulated that 
without this form of group-level self-definition, individuals may prefer to avoid distress 
as a result of in-group membership.  In contrast, in-group homogeneity is associated with 
the perception that the in-group is distinct from the out-group and points to maintaining 
the positive distinctiveness of the in-group from the out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).  
Leach et al. (2008) stated that in-group homogeneity as a component of in-group 
identification would predict opposition to the integration of out-group members into the 
in-group.   
The first component of the second general dimension namely self-investment is 
satisfaction which refers to having a positive feeling about the in-group which is 
associated with psychological attachment to the group including coordinating with other 
in-group members (Leach et al., 2008).  Leach et al. (2008) argued that in order to 
maintain a positive feeling with one’s in-group, negative information about the in-group 
may not be internalised into the self-concept and a variety of strategies may be employed 
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in resisting to do so.  Solidarity as second component refers to the commitment and 
psychological bond that an individual shares with the in-group.  Solidarity differs from 
individual self-stereotyping in that it focuses less on how similar the self is regarding 
other members of the in-group but focuses more on a definition of the self at the group 
level (Leach et al., 2008).  The last component of self-investment as part of in-group 
identification is centrality which refers to the tendency to make the in-group the central 
aspect of the self-concept which is based on Self Categorisation Theory (Turner et al., 
1987).  According to Leach et al. (2008) it is the component of centrality which could 
lead in-group members to legitimize past transgressions. 
Of interest in the studies that Leach et al. (2008) conducted, is Study 7 in 
particular, which examined the five components regarding the prospective prediction of 
individuals’ emotions in real intergroup contexts.  The results of Study 7 clearly indicated 
that individual self-stereotyping was the only component to independently predict group-
based guilt.  It was also the component of individual self-stereotyping which allowed in-
group members to critically view their deeds in an objective way which corresponds with 
“in-group attachment” (Roccas et al., 2004, p. 700).  The ability to critically view the in-
group’s actions is very important as it tends to pave the way for taking responsibility for 
previous harm committed, and for laying the foundation regarding the experience of 
group-based guilt.   
Although there are some differences in the way identification is framed, the 
importance of this concept does not detract from the role it plays in the relationship 
between group-based guilt and reparation intention.  Attachment to one’s group has an 
impact whether guilt at the group level will be experienced.  
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Based on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and Self Categorisation 
Theory (Turner et al., 1987) it can be assumed that if great importance is attached to a 
group, it is less likely that negative information about that specific group will be accepted.  
Individuals derive their social identity based on their group membership that provides 
them with a sense that their group is positively distinctive from another out-group (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1986).  Sharing common values with the in-group links current in-group 
members with those who have gone before.  Similarly good or bad deeds engaged in by 
past in-group members reflects on the current in-group and contributes to the value that is 
placed on the shared identity (e.g., positive or negative value connotation) (Klein, Licata, 
& Pierucci, 2011, p. 564; Powell et al., 2005, p. 509).  High identifying in-group 
members are more likely to define themselves at the group level because the shared 
identity is so important to them (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997). In this instance when 
high identifying in-group members are presented with information that their group has 
harmed another group it seems reasonable that high identifying in-group members would 
experience negative affect.  However, this is not the case as demonstrated by Klein et al. 
(2011).  The authors indicated that the relationship between feelings of group-based guilt 
and in-group identification were non-linear and that identification predicted less 
favourable attitudes to reparation (Klein et al., 2011).  Indeed the results of their study 
indicated a curvilinear relationship between in-group identification with the experience of 
group-based guilt with mid- and low-identifiers experiencing more group-based guilt than 
high in-group identifiers. If high in-group identifiers are intimately associated with their 
group membership then it seems plausible that feelings derived from that specific group 
membership should be enhanced in high identifiers.  However, this does not seem to be 
the case as evident in a tendency to experience less group-based guilt as opposed to low 
in-group identifiers (Doosje et al., 1998).   
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When confronted with negative information regarding transgressions committed 
by in-group members, high in-group identifiers will do just about anything, to dispel 
responsibility for the harmful acts committed in an attempt to protect the shared identity 
(Wohl et al., 2006).  Whereas low in-group identifiers are more open to acknowledge 
illegitimate acts, committed by in-group members, high in-group identifiers are less 
inclined to do so.  Low in-group identifiers are not inhibited by the same motivation 
because the shared identity is not that important to the self and will therefore not be likely 
to engage in group-serving actions (Lickel et al., 2004).  This is important to mention 
because the degree or level of in-group identification (e.g., low and high) may indirectly 
facilitate or inhibit the experience of group-based guilt, taking the following factors into 
account: ambiguous valence of information regarding the past or present transgression/s, 
the source of the information, taking the perspective of the high- or low status group, as 
well as previously offered reparation (Doosje et al., 1998; 2006; Powell et al., 2005; 
Zebel, Doosje, & Spears, 2009). 
In a study conducted by Doosje et al. (1998; Study 2), Dutch students were 
presented with a thoroughly positive, explicitly negative or ambivalent account of their 
nation’s historic immoral behaviour towards Indonesia in three conditions.  National 
identification was made salient in this specific study.  The results indicated that both low 
and high in-group identifiers experienced group-based guilt when the information was 
thoroughly negative.  However, in the ambivalent information condition, high identifiers 
did not experience group based-guilt as opposed to the low identifying in-group members.  
Based on these results it was deduced that high identifying in-group members exonerated 
the group’s immoral action because an opportunity was presented to do so in an attempt 
to protect the group identity. Low in-group identifiers, on the other hand, did not employ 
defensive techniques when confronted with both positive and negative information about 
 
 
25 
 
the in-group’s past, because the shared identity was not that important to them (Doosje et 
al., 1998).  Similarly, Costarelli (2007) and Doosje et al. (2006; Study 1) indicated that 
high in-group identifiers will be less inclined to accept negative information about the in-
group.  When presented with negative in-group information, high in-group identifiers 
tend to assign blame to out-group-internal attributions thereby effectively minimising the 
threat to their social identity and in the process minimise the experience of negative 
affect.  Consequently, when high in-group identifiers received information that threatened 
their collective identity, the experience of group-based guilt was less likely given that the 
information originated from out-group members; however, the inverse was true when the 
source of the information was the in-group.  If members of the in-group delivered the 
negative information itself, it was more likely that high identifying in-group members 
would accept the message without judging the credibility thereof which could result in the 
experience of group-based guilt and consequently in reparative behaviour.   
Another factor that may impact the experience of group-based guilt via in-group 
identification, includes a focus on inequality from either the advantaged or disadvantaged 
perspective. Research conducted by Zebel et al. (2009) indicated that high and low in-
group identifiers may experience group-based guilt differentially based on whether 
inequality was considered from either the disadvantaged or privileged perspective.  
Taking the perspective of the disadvantaged out-group member may facilitate the 
experience of group-based guilt for low identified in-group members. However, placing 
the focus on the illegitimate advantages that in-group members enjoy at the expense of 
the disadvantaged out-group may facilitate group-based guilt for high in-group identifiers 
(Zebel et al., 2009). Furthermore, when high in-group identifiers focus on their 
advantaged position in relation to the disadvantaged group they may respond by lowering 
their level of in-group identification as predicted by Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & 
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Turner, 1986).  Research conducted by Branscombe (1998) demonstrated that when 
privileged group members focus on the benefits they enjoy as a result of their dominant 
position, thoughts about the legitimacy regarding these benefits, may result in lowering 
identification with the in-group.  Research by Powell et al. (2005, p. 517) indicated that 
when thinking about inequality (in-group advantages vs in-group disadvantages) and 
making salient the in-group will have an effect on identification with one’s group (e.g., 
focus on the advantages that men as the dominant group enjoy at the expense of women 
as the non-dominant group is enough to lower identification with the dominant group).  
The degree of in-group identification (e.g., high versus low) and past reparation 
offers (e.g., financial compensation and/or apologies offered) impact on the experience of 
group-based guilt in current times (Doosje et al., 2006).  Research conducted by Doosje et 
al. (2006, p. 335) indicated that high in-group identifiers tend to experience more group-
based guilt if they were informed by the in-group that official apologies has been offered 
for past transgressions.  However, the inverse was true when reparation was dealt with in 
financial terms.  Group-based guilt was higher for high in-group identifiers if they were 
made aware that the out-group was financially compensated (Doosje et al., 2006).  
However it may be, that  in-group identification plays a mediating role (Branscombe, 
2004) in the experience of affect and moderating role on how an event is interpreted 
(Lickel et al., 2004).  
In summary, group-based guilt will not be experienced if the following 
antecedents are not in place, coupled with categorisation at the group level and shared 
identity.  The antecedents include, (1) perceived responsibility for fellow-group members’ 
transgression, (2) perceiving the harmful action as immoral, (3) the perceived cost of 
making amends must not outweigh the benefits and, finally (4) in-group identification 
which impacts the experience of group-based guilt via one of the three proximal 
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antecedents (Branscombe, 2004; Wohl et al., 2006).  If the antecedent conditions are in 
place, the groundwork for the experience of group-based guilt is set as well as its 
consequent behaviour.   
Responses to group-based guilt 
Research has shown that guilt is associated with the tendency to undo 
wrongdoing, through reparation efforts aimed at restoring a damaged relationship at both 
the individual and group level (Branscombe, 2004; Doosje et al., 1998; Harth, Leach, & 
Kessler, 2013; Lickel et al., 2005; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Tangney 1991; 
Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992).  Therefore guilt can be considered a 
motivator for corrective action (Branscombe, 2004; Doosje et al., 1998; Lewis, 2011; 
Tangney, 1991; Tangney et al., 1992; Wohl et al., 2006).  Reparation refers to any 
attempt to support compensation to the victim of harm with the aim of making amends for 
past transgressions committed in the hope of restoring a damaged intergroup relationship 
(Cehajic-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011).  Iyer et al. (2004) indicated 
that there are two specific forms of compensation namely symbolic and material 
compensation associated with group-based guilt.  Both these forms of reparation are 
aimed at restoring morality to “the previously immoral intergroup relation” (Iyer et al., 
2004, p. 279).   
Material reparation is a form of reparation that can be anonymous and/or visible to 
an outside audience and includes financial compensation in the form of cash and/or return 
of land as well as providing socio-economic support to a victimized group (Buford & van 
der Merwe 2004, Berndsen, & McGarty, 2012; Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011; Starzyk & 
Ross, 2008). Symbolic reparations differ from material reparation in that the reparation 
efforts are observable to an outside audience.  Symbolic reparations include erecting 
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monuments in an attempt to promote restitution in an intergroup context, support for 
offering a formal apology and/or “Sorry Day” campaigns, public discussions about the 
transgression/s to facilitate ongoing communication supporting reparation policies, 
creation of peace parks for children, the naming of schools after victimised group 
members as well as changing road names after those regarded as heroes among the 
victimised group (Buford & van der Merwe, 2004; Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011; Doosje et 
al., 1998; 2006; Iyer et al., 2003; Minow, 1998; Starzyk & Ross, 2008, p. 366; Wohl et 
al., 2012).   
The notion of reparation seems to be limited to supportive attitudes only and does 
not seem to  include notions of equality and/or intentions to act or actions as such 
(Allpress, Barlow, Brown, & Louis, 2010; Iyer et al., 2003; Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 
2006).  Iyer et al. (2004) postulated that the reason for this phenomenon could be due to 
the self-focused nature of group-based guilt.  Because group-based guilt is a self-focused 
emotion, that is to say, the main concern is assuaging existing negative feelings from the 
perspective of the transgressor group, rather than a main concern for the welfare of the 
victimised group.  In this instance, transgressor group members are more focused on 
alleviating their own discomfort, thereby making themselves feel better, rather than 
focusing on the needs of the victimised group. Based on this information it therefore 
seems that the functionality of group-based guilt is rather limited (McGarty, Pedersen, 
Leach, Mansell, Waller, & Bliuc, 2005).   
However, a positive attitude is far better than an indifferent attitude and if a more 
positive attitude is projected towards the out-group it seems viable that this attitudinal 
stance could translate into reduced prejudice towards out-group members and may result 
in positive intergroup relationships, at least from the in-group’s perspective (Powell et al., 
2005).  In order to attempt to repair the relationship between transgressor – and 
 
 
29 
 
victimised group members, apologies must be forthcoming, together with beliefs of 
remorse that just might open the door for forgiveness (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2002).  The 
act of saying sorry implies that responsibility has been taken for the harmful action, and 
that the transgressor group is ready and/or prepared to make up for the harm committed 
through reparations.  Although intergroup-relations could be enhanced by offering 
apologies and/or financial reparation, it should be noted that these efforts are not 
guaranteed strategies to bring about forgiveness (Dumont & Waldzus, 2014; Philpot & 
Hornsey, 2008, 2011; Wohl et al., 2012). 
Indeed research conducted by Philpot and Hornsey (2008; 2011), indicated that 
apologies do not necessarily promote forgiveness at the intergroup level.  Their research 
clearly indicated that (1) although victimised group-members were more satisfied by 
apologies rather than not and (2) despite victimised group members advocating the need 
to forgive, as well as (3) the sincerity of apologies delivered by the transgressor group, 
will not result in the granting of forgiveness.  Wohl et al. (2012) hypothesised that the 
relationship between official apologies and intergroup forgiveness is negatively 
influenced by infra-humanisation processes but this time applied by group members of 
the victimised group.  Wohl et al. (2012) showed that when transgressor group members 
offered apologies, victimised group members were less inclined to accept the apologies, 
since they were more reluctant to attribute humanising qualities to the out-group.  In this 
instance when transgressor group members expressed secondary emotions in the apology, 
the victimised group members were not receptive to the apology.  Victimised group 
members were only inclined to consider the apology, if primary emotions were expressed 
in the apology and the apology was delivered by a representative of the victimised group 
(Wohl et al., 2012).   
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Shnabel and Nadler (2008, p. 130) presented a need-based model of reconciliation 
aimed at providing a motivational perspective on the social-emotional reconciliation 
process.  Shnabel and Nadler (2008) as well as Shnabel et al. (2009) indicated that the 
emotional needs differ for transgressor and victimised groups, with the former feeling less 
moral and the latter feeling less powerful, following a transgression.  The transgressor 
group therefore has an emotional need to be socially accepted (e.g., be re-included in a 
moral society) with the victimised group needing to restore their sense of power (Shnabel 
& Nadler, 2008).  By satisfying the deprived emotional needs of both the victimised- and 
transgressor group members, aimed at restoring damaged psychological resources, will 
facilitate reconciliation. However, if these emotional needs are not satisfied, the path to 
reconciliation will be barred.  Once the victimised group perceives a restored sense of 
power and the transgressor group perceives a restored moral image, both of these groups 
will be more willing to engage in reconciliatory practices (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008).  
Albeit this particular model presents a pathway to reconciliation, real life contexts do not 
always provide such a clear-cut route to reconciliation regarding reciprocal behaviour. 
The implications for reparations also differ for the transgressor and the victimised 
group (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2004).  Doosje et al. (2004) 
hypothesised the positive and negative consequences of reparation.  From the perspective 
of the transgressor group, the positive consequences could include potentially improved 
intergroup relationships, a closure of the issue and enhancement of the transgressor 
group’s standing, regarding moral values (Doosje et al., 2004, p. 106). Negative 
consequences from the perspective of the transgressor group could include threats to 
social identity for high in-group identifiers in the process of acknowledging the past as 
well as possible financial cost incurred.  To assume responsibility and apologise for 
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transgressions committed, could possibly result in financial suits from a legal standpoint 
and may therefore want to be avoided (Doosje et al., 2004).   
The positive consequences of reparation from the perspective of the victimised 
group could include providing forgiveness and thereby releasing the transgressor group 
from their self-focused distress as well as financial and/or psychological reparation.  
Another positive consequence of reparation could be to provide a platform that enables 
the victim groups to speak about their experiences that could provide members of the 
victim groups with a sense of validation and control over the transgression/s (Gobodo-
Madikizela, 2002).  Minow (1998) hypothesised that platforms like truth commissions 
reflect and enable re-interpretation processes that are likened to individual therapy 
(Minow, 1998, p. 120).  Providing a platform where victimised group members can tell 
their stories in an uninhibited manner, assists in the healing process.  During the process, 
victimised group members are made aware that the transgression belongs to the past and 
that the past is separate from the present and future which facilitates a sense of control 
(Minow, 1998).  A sense of control promotes feelings of empowerment.  Within this 
process of gaining control, an emotional need is satisfied (i.e., the need for power) which 
restores impaired emotional resources and could possibly result in a willingness to engage 
in reconciliatory behaviour (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008).  The value of truth commissions 
for transgressor groups could be to provide an opportunity to re-humanise them (Minow, 
1998).  To bear witness to victimised group members stories of harm endured, is to be 
charged with a responsibility that cannot be negated (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2002).  During 
such a process, it is possible that guilt is assigned to the transgressor group, although the 
assignment of guilt is not explicitly limited to a truth commission hearing.  In this 
instance while the victimised group members recount stories of harm, the transgressor 
group is expected to take responsibility for the transgression committed coupled with an 
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expectation that the said group should feel remorse (Wohl & Branscombe, 2004; 2005, p. 
2).  The experience of remorse reflects a deep guilt which is deemed a secondary emotion 
(Capozza et al., 2012).  To assign guilt in the process of telling a story is to assign human 
status to the transgressor group because only humans can experience secondary emotions 
(Capozza et al., 2012).  Transgressor group members are thereby re-included in the 
category human race and/or in a moral society and as a result are not infra-humanised but 
re-humanised (Capozza et al., 2012).  Although research conducted by Wohl et al. (2012) 
has indicated that (1) victimised group members tend to believe that their particular group 
are more capable of experiencing complex secondary emotions as opposed to the 
transgressor group and vice versa, (Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, Demoulin, 
Rodriguez-Perez, & Gaunt 2000), and (2) that forgiveness will not be granted based on 
the ability to demonstrate one’s human-ness by expressing complex secondary emotions 
like guilt.  The focus here is not so much as to the granting of forgiveness for the 
transgression, but rather to be able to re-admit the transgressor group into a moral society 
and providing this particular group with the opportunity to attempt to repair the damaged 
relationship. 
The negative consequences of reparation from the victim group perspective could 
include being reminded of a victimised status which some group members could find 
offensive and feelings of pressure induced by the transgressor group to accept reparation 
under duress (Doosje et al., 2004).  In some instances, victimised groups may not be 
motivated to forgive transgression/s committed against them, as an avenue to exert power.  
Being able to refuse an acceptance of an apology is a way of re-establishing power in the 
transgressor-victimised group relationship. It is possible that victimised group members 
may not be ready to let go of their victim status because it provides them with a means of 
defining their identity (see Philpot & Hornsey, 2011).  Another negative consequence of 
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reparation could be to fuel revenge if the reparation is perceived as insufficient or 
suggestive of as a “payoff” (Minow, 1998, p. 132).  Minow (1998) suggested that the 
appropriate or sufficient type of reparation should rather be left to the discretion of 
victimised group members.   
Group-based guilt and reparation intentions in the context of social change  
The relationship between group-based guilt and reparation is positive (Brown, 
Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008; Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011; Doosje et al., 
1998, 2006; Iyer et al., 2003; Klandermans et al., 2008; Paez et al., 2006; Roseman et al., 
1994; Tracy & Robins, 2006; Wohl et al., 2006; Zebel et al., 2009).  However, this 
positive relationship becomes seemingly less significant within the context of social 
change (Dumont & Waldzus, 2014).  Social change is defined as “profound societal 
transformations that produce a complete rupture in the equilibrium of social structures 
because their adaptive capacities are surpassed” (de la Sablonniere, Taylor, Perozzo & 
Sadykova, 2009, p. 325).  Rapid and dramatic social change can be characterised as a 
destabilising force which can be perceived as a threat (de la Sablonniere et al., 2009, p. 
326).  Threat perceptions are likely to impact intergroup relationships because of 
fluctuations in status position.  
Based on the argument that social change affects out-group attitudes and 
intergroup help, Dumont and Waldzus (2014) argued that social change has important 
implications for the experience of group-based guilt and its consequent behaviour.  
Dumont and Waldzus (2014) demonstrated in two correlational studies that social change 
moderates the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention.  In the 
first study it was determined whether or not apartheid is of relevance in the minds of the 
youth, secondly, the authors explored whether white participants perceived social change 
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among white and black South Africans and thirdly, Doosje et al.’s (1998) findings were 
replicated by providing ambiguous information about the in-group’s historical 
wrongdoings toward the out-group with the aim of demonstrating that high identifiers 
with the in-group (e.g., white South Africans) are less likely to experience group-based 
guilt and the resultant readiness to promote reparation.  Indeed the results of the first 
study did support the prediction that a perceived change in the status relations weakens 
the functional relationship between group-based guilt and reparation (Dumont & 
Waldzus, 2014).  The aim of the second study was to replicate the finding that in-group 
status change moderates the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation, 
however using a larger sample.  The results obtained in the second study replicated the 
finding of the first study that the more white participants perceive a loss of status for their 
in-group, the less likely it was that group-based guilt resulted in support for reparation 
(Dumont & Waldzus, 2014). 
Research suggests that a majority of whites do not regard racism and inequality as 
a problem in present times (Outten, Schmitt, Miller, & Garcia, 2012).  In fact, the 
majority of whites seem to believe that inequality is a thing of the past (Norton & 
Sommers, 2011; Outten et al., 2012).  White Americans as opposed to black Americans 
tend to believe that progress towards equality has improved extensively (Eibach & 
Ehrlinger, 2006; Eibach & Keegan, 2006).  Indeed, Eibach and Keegan (2006) have 
demonstrated that high status group members often perceive greater advances toward 
equality as opposed to low status group members. This belief is then probably the reason 
why non-indigenous Australians as the dominant group perceive indigenous Australians 
as the non-dominant group to get undeserved special treatment like free housing, despite 
the latter group being clearly objectively disadvantaged (Berndsen & McGarty, 2012).   
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The erroneous belief that group-based equality exists (e.g., within a country like 
South Africa or that woman earn the same amount as men), can further be perpetuated 
considering group size regarding non-dominant group members (Outten et al., 2012; 
Spoor & Schmitt, 2011).  Kamans, Otten, and Gordijn (2011) indicated that although 
there seems to be no correlation between the size of the group and power at the 
sociological level, there is an association between the former and the latter at a 
psychological level.  In other words, inferences about economic, political and social 
power are made based on the size of the group (e.g., more people equals more power).  
Studies conducted by Outten et al. (2012), demonstrated that dominant groups like white 
Americans and white Canadians felt more threatened when they perceived a future where 
their group would become the minority group (e.g., the smaller group).  Similarly, Spoor 
and Schmitt (2011) indicated that women today as opposed to 50 years ago tend to earn 
more money and are employed in high-powered jobs.  Therefore it is safe to assume that 
women occupy a higher status position in modern times as opposed to women 10 years 
ago (Spoor & Schmitt, 2011).  Based on enhanced numbers representing historically low 
status group members in the workforce in contemporary times, it therefore seems 
plausible that dominant group members (e.g., men) might perceive progress towards 
equality.   
Perceived differences in progress towards equality can be explained by loss 
aversion, based on the assumption that losses for one group means gains for the other 
group (Eibach & Keegan, 2006). Eibach and Keegan (2006) postulated that dominant 
group members tend to frame advances in equality as threatening to their own status 
position.  Similarly, Norton, and Sommers (2011) proposed that whites tend to perceive 
racism as a zero-sum game, where advances in black equality reflect an increase in anti-
white racism.  In this instance, whites do not only perceive progress in equality for non-
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dominant groups but also perceive this increase in equality as threatening the status 
position of the dominant group regarding resources (Norton & Sommers, 2011).   
Differences in perceived progress towards equality can also be explained by 
subjective comparisons with a point in time (past or future) as demonstrated by de la 
Sablonniere et al. (2009). De la Sablonniere et al. (2009) hypothesised that focus on 
temporal collective relative deprivation provides insight into how individuals react to 
social change.  Temporal collective relative deprivation involves comparing the in-
group’s current status, which forms the baseline for all other comparisons, with the in-
group’s status at some other point in time (de la Sablonniere et al., 2009).  De la 
Sablonniere et al. (2009), suggested that in times characterised by rapid and dramatic 
social change, temporal comparisons become salient as opposed to social comparisons.  
The reason is because when threatened due to changes, it is unclear which country or 
group can serve as a comparison point of reference (de la Sablonniere et al., 2009).  
Therefore, temporal collective relative deprivation seems well-suited to explain why 
different groups tend to compare their current position with different points in time when 
confronted with threat to the groups’ status position. In line with this reasoning, dominant 
group members tend to compare their current position with some reference point in the 
past.  This could result in perceptions that progress towards equality is more successful 
than it actually is (Eibach & Ehrlinger, 2006; Eibach & Keegan, 2006; Norton & 
Sommers, 2011).  Non-dominant group members, on the other hand, tend to compare 
their status position with some point in the future which could result in perceptions that 
progress towards equality is not as successful as the dominant group perceives it to be 
(Eibach & Ehrlinger, 2006; Eibach & Keegan, 2006; Norton & Sommers, 2011). 
Since the abolition of apartheid in South Africa racial groups have had more 
contact than prior to 1994.  And although beliefs of a harmonious, integrated rainbow 
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nation are maintained (see Murray, 1997), enhanced intergroup contact may also 
perpetuate erroneous beliefs regarding equality (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009).  
Saguy et al. (2009) demonstrated that positive intergroup contact between members of 
high and low status groups tend to attenuate actions aimed at securing equality.  When the 
low status group does not engage in collective action to secure equality, it follows that 
high status group members may perceive that all is well, when in fact it is not. 
Although Kamans et al. (2011) contend that the powerless experience the greatest 
threat, Ellemers, Doosje, van Knippenberg, and Wilke (1992) differ in their assessment.  
Apart from beliefs that only low status group members may perceive threat, high status 
group members may also perceive threats to their status position.  Indeed, Ellemers et al. 
(1992) indicated that high status minority groups tend to enhance identification with their 
group if it seems possible that their in-group status position might change with behaviours 
aimed at protecting their status position in the face of threat (Ellemers et al., 1992).  This 
reasoning is similar to that of Scheepers and Ellemers (2005) who posited that threat will 
be experienced in anticipation of perceived changes in intergroup relations because of 
changes in the existing status hierarchy.  Indeed as Tajfel (1978) has indicated status 
hierarchies are inherently dynamic and changeable and must either be maintained or 
defended against.  Therefore it follows that high status in-group members must be ever-
vigilant for possible sources of threat aimed at usurping resources via a change in the 
status relations between groups (Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005).  When intergroup threats 
are prevalent, in-group members will differ in their responses due to a differing degree of 
in-group identification (Nadler & Halabi, 2006).  Depending on whether an individual 
identifies highly or not with the in-group, will determine the reaction towards the threat 
(Doosje, Spears, & Ellemers, 2002; see Ellemers et al., 1997; Petit & Lount, 2011).  
Research to this effect was conducted by Doosje et al. (2002), which indicated that with 
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reference to low status groups, high identifiers will stay together no matter what the 
future holds for them under conditions of threat, whereas low identifiers will not only 
acknowledge identification with the low status group but will increase their identification 
with the said group, if status improvement seems imminent. 
However, with reference to high status group members, low identifiers will 
respond by lowering their identification further with the in-group, expressing more out-
group favouritism, whereas high identifiers on the other hand, will tend to enhance their 
identification with the said group resulting in more out-group discrimination in an attempt 
to protect the group’s advantaged position (Nadler & Halabi, 2006; Morrison, Plaut, & 
Ybarra 2010; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2010; Outten et al., 2012, Study 2, p. 21).  Indeed, 
high in-group identifiers tend to increase perceptions of out-group homogeneity when 
faced with threat (Morton, Postmes, Haslam, & Hornsey, 2009).  Doosje and Branscombe 
(2003) indicated that status stability may have an impact on perceptions of group 
variability.  When negative information about the in-group is presented, high in-group 
identifiers will perceive enhanced group variability as opposed to low in-group identifiers 
who will perceive less group variability.  This tendency serves an exonerating function 
for high in-group identifiers because it implies that high identifiers effectively distance 
themselves from the black sheep of the in-group, on the one hand, and protect the social 
identity, on the other.   
Possible sources of threat that may induce high in-group identifiers to protect their 
shared identity could include threats of a symbolic existential nature  (e.g., doing away 
with representations of a group’s culture), perceived loss in status position and/or 
perceived increase in group size (e.g., low status groups) as well as a loss of economic 
and political power (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Dumont &Waldzus, 2014; Iyer & Leach, 
2008; Outten et al., 2012; Spoor & Schmitt, 2011; Wohl, Branscombe, & Reysen, 2010).  
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Riek, Mania, and Gaertner (2006) indicated that realistic threat (e.g., economic threat) 
predicted negative out-group attitudes towards low-status groups.  In-group perceptions 
regarding threats to the status position by the out-group could result in withholding 
empowerment help which could impact negatively on reparation intentions and intensify 
the existing tensions between groups (Gunn & Wilson, 2011; Nadler & Halabi, 2006; 
Outten et al., 2012).   
On the basis of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), the validity of a 
group’s particular status position is further solidified by perceptions of stability, 
legitimacy and permeability.  Tajfel and Turner (1986) defined stability of status as the 
likelihood that an alternative position for the whole group is possible and achievable, 
legitimacy of status as the extent to which the existing status structure is objectively 
accepted as legitimate by both high- and low-status groups, and the permeability of group 
boundaries as the degree to which membership can be achieved preferably in a high 
status group.  The combination of status stability and legitimacy perceptions will 
determine how high status in-group members will react to perceived threats in an attempt 
to maintain positive social identity (Saguy & Dovidio, 2013. p. 1031). 
Research conducted by Saguy and Dovidio (2013) indicated that high status group 
members are more willing to discuss status differences and commonalities if the current 
status position is deemed illegitimate but intergroup relationships are characterised as 
being stable.  Under these conditions the benefit for high status group members lies 
therein that they could alleviate “moral concerns” on the one hand and facilitate 
perceptions that they are in fact pro-equality in principle, on the other, without losing any 
of their advantages (Saguy & Dovidio, 2013, p. 1032). 
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However, when intergroup interactions seem unstable, high status group members 
may be motivated to defend the groups’ advantaged position (Saguy & Dovidio, 2013).  
Research conducted by Scheepers and Ellemers (2005), demonstrated that, high status 
group members tend to experience a physiological threat response when change to the 
power hierarchy was introduced.  In such an instance, high status group members 
exhibited more discriminatory behaviour towards the low status group members because 
the high status group members’ advantaged position was under threat (Georgesen & 
Harris, 2006).  The tendency to be more discriminatory towards low status group 
members, reflects a motivation to protect and/or restore the group’s advantaged position 
(Saguy & Dovidio, 2013).  Saguy and Dovidio (2013) indicated that under conditions of 
instability, high status group members are less inclined to discuss commonalities or status 
differences because of the pervasive feelings of threat.  In this instance it seems quite 
plausible that discussions about status differences may in fact re-legitimize status 
relations (Saguy & Dovidio, 2013, p. 1039).    
Turner and Brown (1978) indicated that high status group members tend to show 
enhanced in-group favouritism when status differences were characterised as legitimate 
but unstable.  When high status members perceive that their current high status position is 
changing for the worse, and they believe their high status position is in fact legitimate, 
they may respond by discriminating against low status group members or within the 
current context, not support any form of reparation.  Consistent with Social Identity 
Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), research conducted by Scheepers and Ellemers (2005) 
indicated that high status group members experience social identity threats when possible 
changes to the status position are perceived.  Likewise Georgesen and Harris (2006), 
indicated that high status group members exhibited more discrimination towards low 
status group members when status relations were deemed unstable.  
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After the abolishment of apartheid in 1994, South Africa is dealing with the 
consequences of dramatic social change and therefore finds itself in a position of flux 
regarding social and economic transformation (Dumont & Waldzus, 2014; Niens, Cairns, 
Finchilescu, Foster, & Tredoux, 2003).  The economic power still reside within the hands 
of the dominant privileged minority (Dumont & van Lill, 2009; see Finchilescu & 
Tredoux, 2010). Indeed, this has implications regarding stability perceptions for both 
high- and low-status group members.  Following a social change episode, like the 
cessation of apartheid, high status in-group members may perceive a threat to their 
advantaged economic and power position as opposed to low status out-group members 
who may perceive that conditions have improved (de la Sablonniere, Auger, Taylor, 
Crush, & McDonald, 2013).  This fluctuation between intergroup relations, post change 
therefore reflects an unstable situation.   
Manipulation of group-based guilt within the context of South Africa 
Within the South African context, it is safe to assume that since the abolition of 
apartheid, some present day white South Africans may experience group-based guilt for 
this specific transgression.  It was assumed that group-based guilt may be an ever-present 
emotion.  Therefore, it was decided not to induce this emotion by manipulating historic 
perceptions, which differs from the approach originally utilised by Doosje et al. (1998).  
In the study conducted by Doosje et al. (1998), group-based guilt was induced by 
experimentally manipulating the in-group’s behavioural history toward the out-group.  
This was achieved by providing a description of the in-group’s negative treatment of the 
out-group.  In their study, Doosje et al. (1998, p. 875) manipulated group-bias (low versus 
high), and personal bias (low versus high).  In the low group-bias condition, in-group 
members were informed that previous data indicated that their group has always been fair 
in their treatment of out-group members and this trend is also present in current times 
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(Doosje et al., 1998, p. 875). Participants in the high group-bias condition were informed 
that previous data indicated that they have always demonstrated unfair behaviour towards 
the out-group and that the prejudicial behaviour is ongoing and present (Doosje et al., 
1998).  A similar pattern was employed in manipulating personal bias.  In the low 
personal bias condition, participants were informed that they did not and still do not 
undervalue the out-group as opposed to the high personal bias condition where 
participants were informed they did and still do undervalue out-group members (Doosje 
et al., 1998).  In the second study, group-based guilt was induced by manipulating the 
history of the in-group (e.g., unfavourable, ambiguous or favourable).  Participants were 
provided with a one-page summary of their countries’ colonial history ostentatiously from 
an American encyclopaedia which also included two pictures illustrating Dutch people 
during the colonial period.  The pictures differed depending on the condition.  In the 
unfavourable condition it was stated that the Dutch irrevocably exploited Indonesians to 
the latter’s detriment.  In the favourable condition, participants were made to believe that 
the Dutch contributed to the development of Indonesians.  Finally, in the ambiguous 
condition, participants were provided with both positive and negative accounts of Dutch 
contributions to Indonesia and its people (Doosje et al., 1998, p. 880).   
Although none can negate the efficiency of the approach used to manipulate 
group-based guilt as demonstrated by Doosje et al. (1998), considering the South African 
context, this was not deemed the most appropriate method.  Other reasons why group-
based guilt was not induced in this particular study was because of the ambiguity of 
group-based guilt manipulations measured in previous studies as well as ethical 
considerations (e.g., inducing group-based guilt in students did not seem like the moral 
thing to do).  Therefore instead of manipulating group-based guilt directly, the present 
study applied a rather indirect approach by manipulating the judgments of past 
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transgressions based on the research of Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klump, Rittenauer-
Schatka, and Simons (1991).  Schwarz et al. (1991) tested systematically in their research 
the availability heuristic as introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1973), which 
postulates that people estimate the frequency of an event or the likelihood of its 
occurrence “by the ease of which instances or associations comes to mind” (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973, p. 208). Schwarz et al. (1991) argued that the content of recall and the 
ease/difficulty of recall are two interrelated dimensions in that the implications of the 
recalled content depends on the ease or difficulty of which that content was brought to 
mind. Whereas the content of recalled instances would suggest that these instances are 
typical and frequent, the difficulty in recalling these instances however would suggest 
that they cannot be that typical.  The authors tested this assumption in three experimental 
studies by repeatedly showing that people only rely on the content of their recall if its 
implications are not called into question by the difficulty they experienced in the recalling 
process.  Schwarz et al.’s (1991) findings suggest “that difficulty in recall may decrease 
judgment of frequency, probability, or typicality, much as ease of recall has been assumed 
to increase these judgments” (Schwarz et al., 1991, p.201). 
In the original study of Schwarz et al. (1991), participants were asked to describe 
either six or 12 examples of assertive or unassertive behaviour based on the prediction 
that the content of the event couples with the ease or difficulty related with the recall 
process will impact on the degree of the behaviour.  The combined results of the study 
(Schwarz et al., 1991) clearly indicated that those participants, who provided six 
examples of assertive behaviour, evaluated themselves as more assertive than those who 
provided 12 examples.  Similarly those participants who provided six examples of 
unassertive behaviour rated themselves as less assertive than those participants who 
provided 12 examples (Schwarz et al., 1991, p. 201).  
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In the present study it was assumed that if participants were asked to recall three 
examples of various transgressions white South Africans committed toward black South 
Africans during apartheid, the recall would be experienced as easy and these 
transgressions would be judged as frequent and typical.  However, if participants were 
asked to recall 12 examples of various transgressions, it was assumed that the recall 
process would be experienced as difficult and therefore the transgressions would be 
judged as atypical and less frequent. 
Since the fall of apartheid, some white South Africans may perceive a decline in 
status whereas other white South Africans may perceive that their status position has 
remained relatively unchanged (Dumont & Waldzus, 2014; de la Sablonniere et al., 2013, 
p. 705).  In strong loss of status conditions, participants were instructed to provide three 
examples of white South Africans’ status decline.  It was assumed that if participants 
were asked to recall three examples of white South Africans’ status decline, it would 
result in the experience of perceived strong loss of status  (e.g., it was considered an easy 
task to recall three examples).  In the weak status loss conditions, participants were again 
instructed to provide three examples of areas in which the standing of white South 
Africans has remained relatively high.  Again, it was assumed that if participants were 
asked to recall three examples of areas in which the standing of white South Africans has 
remained relatively high, it would result in the experience of perceived weak status loss 
(e.g., because nothing has really changed since the abolition of apartheid).  Those 
examples, which were easy to recall, constituted proximal thoughts and those examples, 
which were more difficult to recall, constituted peripheral thoughts (Schwarz et al., 1991, 
p. 196).   
In order to eradicate inequality, some examples of the programmes  implemented 
by the ANC included, Affirmative Action, Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment 
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initiatives, Reconstruction and Development programmes and the implementation of the 
Employment Equity Act to name a few (Nel, Kirsten, Swanepoel, Erasmus, & Poisat, 
2012). Although programmes were put in place to facilitate equality, South Africa today 
remains an unequal country (Durrheim, Tredoux, Foster, & Dixon, 2011; Finchilescu & 
Tredoux, 2010).  The economic power in South Africa still resides within the hands of 
white South Africans who currently occupy a high status position (Dumont & van Lill, 
2009; see Finchilescu & Tredoux, 2010).  Despite the objective inequality that exists 
along racial lines in South Africa, the minority high status group (white South Africans), 
however, perceive that their group is marginalised by ongoing attempts to eradicate 
inequality (see Dumont & Waldzus, 2014).  Feelings of marginalisation, associated with 
perceptions that the in-group is losing status and will continue to lose status in the future, 
perpetuate beliefs of threat that impacts on helping relations in the form of reparations 
(Dumont & Waldzus, 2014).  Intergroup reparation is a key ingredient in the achievement 
of reconciliation.  However, reparations will not be supported under conditions of threat 
to the status position of the in-group (see Dumont & Waldzus, 2014).  Although social 
psychological research has indicated that group-based guilt and reparation are positively 
related, it seems, however, that this positive relationship becomes seemingly less 
significant when change to the status position seems evident (Dumont & Waldzus, 2014) 
Therefore the present research is aimed at extending our understanding of the 
relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intentions by conceptualising 
social change as a condition that moderates this relationship and by testing this 
moderation function in two experiments. The two experiments will be reported in the 
following section. 
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Experiment 1 
In the first experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
experimental conditions in a 2 (group-based guilt: low versus high) x 2 (status loss: weak 
versus strong) factorial between-subjects design, using an online survey software program 
named Qualtrics. The target population was white South African undergraduate students 
registered at the University of South Africa in the social sciences (comprised students 
from the social-work, developmental studies, psychology, and political sciences 
departments).  The main focus of the study revolved around the experience of group-
based guilt within the South African context using apartheid as transgression.  Many 
white South Africans who played no part in apartheid (e.g., born frees) may experience 
group-based guilt for transgressions that were committed by other in-group members 
during this particular period.  The students represented the born-free generation because 
only students that were born slightly prior to and after the end of apartheid were included 
in the study. 
Approval to conduct the study and the use of students as participants was granted 
by the Ethical Research Committee at the College of Graduate Studies as well as the 
Senate of Research and Innovation and Higher Degrees Committee at the University of 
South Africa.  The dependent variable under investigation was reparation intentions; with 
group-based guilt and status loss comprising the two independent variables.  The study 
attempted to investigate the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation within 
the context of social change.  More specifically it was hypothesised that group-based guilt 
will not have a positive effect on reparation intention if in-group members perceived a 
strong loss of status.  On the other hand, group-based guilt will have a more positive 
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effect on reparation intentions if in-group members perceived that they are not losing 
status or at least experience weaker status loss.  
Sample   
In February 2014, a total of 5 740 e-mails were sent to white South African 
undergraduate social science students, registered at the University of South Africa.  In order 
to be deemed a ‘born free’, only undergraduate students who were born after 1988, were 
invited to participate in the experiment.  Of the 5 740 e-mails sent, 491 students opened the 
webpage (8%) and 312 started the experiment (63.6%). In total, 251 (80.4%) participants 
named examples in both manipulations (as requested), 41 participants (13.1%) named 
examples in only one manipulation; whilst 20 participants (6.4%) did not name any 
examples. Of these 251 participants a total of 100 (39.8%) responded to items measuring 
the most relevant variables (e.g., reparation intention, group-based guilt and responsibility 
items) and 96 (38.3%) completed all items in the questionnaire.  Based on the results of the  
content analysis reported under heading Preliminary Analysis a final sample of 90 
participants was selected, which consisted of 8 (9%) white male participants and 81 (91%) 
white female participants, ranging between the age of 18 to 26 (Mage = 22, SD = 2.11). The 
final sample was distributed to the four experimental conditions as outlined in Table 1. 
Table 1: Number of participants in the four experimental conditions, respectively. 
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Group-based guilt 
 High Low 
Strong  n = 27 n = 18 
Weak  n = 23 n = 22 
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Procedure   
The e-mails sent to the white South African undergraduate students contained a 
link to the Qualtrics online survey.  Once the online survey was opened, by clicking on 
the link, participants were informed that the study is part of an international research 
project headed by the School of Interdisciplinary Research at the University of South 
Africa and if the prospective student intended to participate, he or she should read the 
information carefully.  Participants were informed that the aim of the study was to 
understand whether and how past conflicts between social groups impact on their present 
experience.  It was stated that the study did not require the provision of right and/or 
wrong answers, but was only focused on obtaining honest opinions.  Prospective 
participants were informed that the survey would take between 15 to 20 minutes to 
complete and that participation was voluntary.  Participants were also informed that they 
might withdraw at any given moment without further consequences.  Anonymity was 
assured and participants were informed that the results would only be analysed at a group 
level with the intention of publication in scientific journals.  Information on any 
foreseeable risks was also included although it was clearly stated that no risks were 
anticipated.  Participants were informed that once the data collection of the study ceased, 
they could stand a chance to win a lucky draw to the value of 1000 ZAR.  Consent to 
participate was indicated by clicking >>.   
The manipulation of the judgment bias (group-based guilt manipulation, low 
versus high) and status loss (weak versus strong) was followed by six items measuring 
reparation intention.  It should be noted that all items were randomly presented.  The 
reparation intention items were followed by the manipulation check for group-based guilt 
and status loss.  Responsibility was measured with three items followed by the 
measurement of group-based guilt comprising four items.  Participants were asked to 
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indicate to which group (e.g., White, Black, Indian, Coloured or Other) they belonged.  
In-group identification was measured using ten items followed by questions pertaining to 
gender, age, and country of residence as well as nationality. Upon completion of the 
study, participants were debriefed and thanked for the participation regarding time and 
effort.  Anonymity and confidentiality was again assured and participants were again 
informed that the results would only be analysed at a group level for publication in a 
scientific journal.  Lastly, participants were requested to provide either an e-mail address 
or cell phone number if they wanted to participate in the lucky draw with the complete 
assurance that the information would not be stored and would only be used to contact the 
winner of the lucky draw of 1000 ZAR.  Participants could exit the survey by clicking on 
>>. 
Manipulation of the independent variables: group-based guilt and status 
Manipulation of the guilt conditions: high versus low group-based guilt.  
Group-based guilt was not directly manipulated but rather the ease/difficulty of recalling 
information, which was an indirect measure of group-based guilt.  In the high group-
based guilt conditions, participants were given the following information: “Take a minute 
and think about the apartheid period in South Africa. Think about the various 
transgressions white South Africans committed toward black South Africans during this 
period. For these transgressions some white South Africans feel guilt. Please briefly 
describe three (3) examples of these wrongdoings for which white South Africans may 
feel guilt, even if they were not necessarily individually involved”.  
Directly below this information, participants were provided with three text boxes 
labelled Wrongdoing 1, Wrongdoing 2 and Wrongdoing 3, where the participants could 
type in their examples. 
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In the low group-based guilt conditions, participants were given the following 
information: “Take a minute and think about the apartheid period in South Africa. Think 
about the various transgressions white South Africans committed toward black South 
Africans during this period. For these transgressions some white South Africans feel 
guilt. Please briefly describe twelve (12) examples of these wrongdoings for which white 
South Africans may feel guilt, even if they were not necessarily individually involved.  
Directly below this information, participants were provided with twelve text boxes 
labelled Wrongdoing 1, Wrongdoing 2, Wrongdoing 3, Wrongdoing 4, etc., where the 
participants could type in their examples. 
Manipulation of the status conditions: strong versus weak status loss.  In the 
strong status loss conditions, participants were provided with the following information: 
“Apartheid was demolished 20 years ago when South Africa held its first-ever free and 
democratic elections. A lot has happened since then. South Africa has developed into a 
country that won the Rugby World Cup in 1995, that successfully hosted the Soccer 
World Cup in 2010, and that became a favourite holiday destination for people from all 
over the world. 
Most obviously, the relationship between white and black South Africans changed 
over the last 20 years. White and black South Africans use the same public facilities and 
spaces, they work in the same jobs, and they buy properties in the same suburbs. With all 
these changes there are areas in which the standing of white South Africans has been 
declining. We would like you to write down up to three (3) examples of this tendency”.  
Directly below this information, participants were provided with three text boxes 
labelled Example 1, Example 2 and Example 3, where the participants could type in their 
examples. 
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In the perceived weak status loss conditions in Experiment 1, participants were 
provided with the following information: “Apartheid was demolished 20 years ago when 
South Africa held its first-ever free and democratic elections. A lot has happened since 
then. South Africa has developed into a country that won the Rugby World Cup in 1995, 
that successfully hosted the Soccer World Cup in 2010, and that became a favourite 
holiday destination for people from all over the world. 
Most obviously, the relationship between white and black South Africans changed 
over the last 20 years. White and black South Africans use the same public facilities and 
spaces, they work in the same jobs, and they buy properties in the same suburbs. With all 
these changes there are areas in which the standing of white South Africans has remained 
relatively high.  We would like you to write down up to three (3) examples of this tendency”.  
Participants were asked to provide only three examples in the text boxes labelled Example 
1, Example 2 and Example 3.   
Measurements   
All measurements were presented on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  Participants were instructed to rate their 
agreement or disagreement with each statement by selecting their choice on the scale.  
Only the manipulation checks regarding group-based guilt and status loss was presented 
on a 10-point slider ranging from 1 (very easy) to 10 (very difficult) and 1 (strongly 
declining) to 10 (strongly rising), respectively.   
Dependant Variable 
The dependent variable, reparation intention was measured using six items 
developed by Brown et al. (2008) and adapted for the South African context by Dumont 
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and Waldzus (2014); “I believe white South Africans should try to repair some of the 
damage they have caused black South Africans during apartheid”; “I do not think that 
white South Africans owe something to black South Africans because of the things that 
were done to them during  apartheid (reversed)”; “I  think that white South Africans 
should apologise to black  South Africans for past harmful actions”; “I think that white 
South Africans should help black South Africans to reclaim their land”; “I think that 
black South Africans deserve some form of compensation from white South  Africans for 
what happened to them during the apartheid years”; and finally “I feel that black  South 
Africans should have economic benefits as reparation for the damage white South 
Africans caused them” (Cronbach Alpha  = .82).   
Manipulation Checks of the Independent Variables  
The following question was posed to the participants that constituted the 
manipulation check of group-based guilt: “How difficult was it for you to generate the 
requested number of wrongdoings for which white South Africans may feel guilt, even if 
they were not necessarily individually involved?” A slider was provided and participants 
were instructed to position themselves on the slider to indicate how difficult it was to 
generate the requested numbers of wrongdoing ranging on a scale from 1 (very easy) to 
10 (very difficult).   
The status loss manipulation was tested by posing the question: “When you think 
about the changes of white South Africans' standing in post-apartheid South Africa, do 
you think their standing has been rising or declining?”  Again a slider was provided and 
participants were instructed to position themselves on the slider ranging from 1 (strongly 
declining) to 10 (strongly rising).   
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Inter-individual difference Variables 
Responsibility was measured using three items developed by Cehajic-Clancy and 
Brown (2014) and adapted by Dumont and Waldzus (2014, Study 1, Cronbach Alpha = 
.66): “I consider white South Africans to be responsible for the atrocities committed 
during apartheid”; “I think that white South Africans should feel responsible for the 
things that happened during apartheid”; and “I do not perceive white South Africans 
being responsible for their transgressions committed during apartheid (reversed)” 
(Cronbach Alpha = .80).  
Group-based guilt was assessed as an inter-individual difference measure using 
four items that were developed by Brown et al. (2008) and adapted by Dumont and 
Waldzus (2014; Study 1, Cronbach Alpha  = .91) for the South African context: “When I 
think about things white South Africans have done during apartheid, I sometimes feel 
guilty”; “I occasionally feel guilty for the human rights violations committed by white 
South Africans during the apartheid years”; “When thinking about how white South 
Africans took away homes from black South Africans, I sometimes feel guilty”; and lastly 
“I do not feel any guilt for the things white South Africans did to black South  Africans 
during apartheid (reversed)”. The construct group-based guilt formed a reliable scale with 
the Cronbach Alpha of .91.  
In-group identification as an inter-individual difference variable was measured 
using ten items based on research conducted by Leach et al. (2008).  According to the 
authors, in-group identification is not a unitary component and offered a hierarchical two-
dimensional (self-investment and self-definition) model with five specific components 
(solidarity, satisfaction, centrality, self-stereotyping and in-group homogeneity) of in-
group identification.  The items selected were: “I feel strong bonds with white people”; “I 
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feel committed to white people”; “I am glad to be white.”; “I think that white people have 
a lot to be proud of”; “I often think about the fact that I am white”; “Being white is an 
important part of how I see myself”; “I have a lot in common with the average white 
person”; I am similar to the average white person”; “White people have a lot in common 
with each other”; and “White people are very similar to each other”. The construct in-
group identification formed a reliable scale with the Cronbach Alpha = .86. 
Results 
Preliminary Analysis 
Before any preliminary results were computed, a content analysis was conducted 
to determine what type of examples participants provided in Experiment 1.  The 
reasoning behind this decision stems from the fact that participants had carte blanche in 
providing examples of wrongdoings for which some white South Africans may feel guilt.  
In order to control whether participants engaged in legitimising acts (e.g., they did not 
provide examples relevant to the question), it was decided to conduct a content analysis 
as part of the preliminary analysis.   
A classification system was developed based on information regarding the type of 
transgressions that were committed during the apartheid years.  Sources consulted 
included the TRC’s report regarding Findings and Recommendations (1998; 2003).  Two 
papers by Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, (senior research professor in trauma, memory and 
forgiveness at the University of the Free State in South Africa) and former member of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission were also consulted.  These included 
“Remembering the Past: Nostalgia, Traumatic Memory, and the Legacy of Apartheid” 
(2012) and “Remorse, Forgiveness, and Rehumanization: Stories from South Africa” 
(2002).  Other sources included a paper written by Kathleen Ho titled “Structural 
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Violence as a Human Rights Violation” which was published in the Essex Human Rights 
Review (2007); work by Lovell Fernandez (“Reparations policy in South Africa for the 
victims of apartheid”) who is a Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at the 
University of the Western Cape (1999); as well as a paper by Debra Kaminer, Dan Stein, 
Irene Mbanga, Nompumelelo Zungu-Dirwayi titled “The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa” (2001).  The work of Gail Hovey (Ms Hovey was the 
research director for the American Committee on Africa/The Africa Fund) was also 
consulted (“Human Rights Violations in Apartheid”), published in 1983.  Literature based 
on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), regarding the tendency to legitimise 
the in-groups’ negative actions, were consulted and included work by Branscombe 
(2004), Wohl et al. (2006), and Miron et al. (2006).  The classification code 
dehumanisation was included based on work by Capozza et al. (2012), Cehajic et al. 
(2009), and Leyens et al. (2007).  Finally, it was decided to include a category none 
because it seemed plausible that some participants would have mentioned wrongdoings 
that had nothing to do with apartheid (e.g. the Anglo-Boer war).  It was decided to keep 
the classification codes to a maximum of five categories due to the small sample size.  
The final categories comprised: gross human rights violations, dehumanisation, 
structural violence, legitimising/denial and none.   
The gross human rights violations category was defined as any act which included 
killing, abduction with intent to kill, torture, severe ill-treatment, entrapment and 
detention.  Some of the examples that were provided by participants included: 
“Undeserved physical abuse which was rarely justified”, “The innocent lives lost during 
the Apartheid era”, “arrest, torture and degradation” and “White people may feel guilty 
because of the way black people were treated, abused and tortured”.   
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The dehumanising category was defined as any act where a person of colour was 
deprived of positive human qualities (e.g., humans are equated with animals).  This 
category also included infra-humanisation tendencies (e.g., ascribing lesser secondary 
emotions to people) as well as statements that had to do with being stripped of dignity or 
being treated like slaves.  Examples from the responses of participants included: 
“Slavery”, “Treating black people like they were animals” and “Degrading [the] humanity 
in black citizens of South Africa”.   
The structural violence category referred to a form of violence where social 
structures or social institutions may harm people by preventing them from meeting their 
basic needs.  This category included any mentioning of individual discrimination, racial 
classification, exile, banning of persons, restricted movement, press censorship, people of 
different races could not marry or have sexual relations, no voting rights, retracted 
citizenship, jobs reserved for whites, Bantu education, residential segregation, forced 
migration/forced removal, seizure of homes, influx control and pass laws.  Examples of 
the responses of participants included: “Keeping black people from being educated 
properly and having a voice/say in the voting and other matters”, “Preventing minorities 
from being able to go to the same places as whites”, “segregation act”, “Separate beaches, 
amenities, benches etc.”, “Banned from public activities”, “The oppression of black South 
Africans through means of not letting them be equal to the white South Africans. I am 
referring to the type of jobs and the distribution thereof. The manner in which they could 
or could not use public transport. That there was a clear separation between the two 
parties involved” and “discrimination”.  
The legitimising/denial category referred to any act which reflected a tendency not 
to take responsibility.  It also included any reference made to whites who had no choice 
but to obey the law, any reference made to let’s move on and forget the past as well as 
 
 
57 
 
any reference or tendencies to dissociate from the things that happened during apartheid.  
Some examples included: “White people shouldn't feel guilty for apartheid as it wasn't 
everyone as a whole who made the decision. We were simply forced to be a part of it”, 
“Not familiar with situations from the apartheid” and “I don't really believe there were, 
compared to America, South Africa apartheid was like a slap on the wrist. All race groups 
had their own area and if you crossed into another you got punished. Simple. However, I 
do think a leader punishment as well as no differential treatment regardless of race.  
Therefore anyone got punished for crossing”.   
The category none was defined as any type of example that had nothing to do with 
the apartheid period. For instance if participants provided responses that included any 
historical events prior to 1948, e.g., Jan van Riebeeck landing in the Cape, Boer wars etc. 
An example that was provided by participants included: “The blacks did prove them 
wrong”.    
Two independent raters, blind to the experimental conditions, coded the responses 
according to the classification system.  The interrater reliability analyses using Kappa 
statistics were performed to determine the consistency between the two raters.  
Ambiguous responses were discussed until agreement was reached. 
The interrater reliability for the first experiment ranged from acceptable (Kappa = 
.569) to excellent (Kappa = 1.000) according to Fleiss, Levin, and Paik (2004).  However, 
the interrater reliability for wrongdoing example 10 (as seen in Table 2 below) was 
indicated as poor agreement (Fleiss et al., 2004).  The results for the interrater reliabilities 
in Experiment 1 are summarised in Table 2. 
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Table 2.  Interrater reliabilities of Experiment 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wrongdoing Examples Interrater Reliability 
Wrongdoing example 1 Kappa = .780, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 2 Kappa = .883, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 3 Kappa = .713, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 4 Kappa = .569, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 5 Kappa = .937, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 6 Kappa = .783, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 7 Kappa = .847, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 8 Kappa = .631, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 9 Kappa = .921, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 10 Kappa = .320, p = .014 
Wrongdoing example 11 Kappa = .770, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 12 Kappa = .688, p < .001 
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The analysis of frequencies of the first three examples that participants provided 
(see Tables 3, 4 and 5 below), across the different conditions, revealed that participants 
chose examples pertaining to structural violence more often as opposed to other 
examples.   
Table 3.  Frequency of categories: first example, Experiment 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Frequency of categories: second example, Experiment 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Per 
cent 
 None 1 1.0 1.0 
Gross Human 
Rights Violations 
15 15.0 15.0 
Dehumanisation 5 5.0 5.0 
Structural 
Violence 
73 73.0 73.0 
Legitimising or 
Denial 
6 6.0 6.0 
Total 100 100.0 100.0 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
 None 2 2.0 2.0 
Gross Human 
Rights Violations 
14 14.0 14.1 
Dehumanisation 3 3.0 3.0 
Structural 
Violence 
78 78.0 78.8 
Legitimising or 
Denial 
2 2.0 2.0 
Total 99 99.0 100.0 
Missing System 1 1.0  
Total 100 100.0  
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Table 5.  Frequency of categories: third example, Experiment 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To determine if participants differed regarding the type of examples they provided 
across the different experimental conditions (e.g., did the examples of participants 
randomly allocated to the first condition differ significantly from the examples of 
participants randomly allocated to the second, third or fourth experimental condition), a 
Pearson chi-square test were conducted.  The results revealed that the type of examples 
did not differ across the different experimental conditions (first example of wrongdoing 
over the four experimental conditions: Chi square value = 13.162, df = 12, p = .357; 
second example of wrongdoing: Chi square value = 12.157, df = 12, p = .433; third 
example of wrongdoing: Chi square value = 20.762, df = 12, p = .054).  However, what 
was interesting, just by looking at the examples participants provided, was the 
legitimising behaviour some participants engaged in (see Tables 3, 4 and 5 above).  It was 
decided that participants would only be included in the final analysis if they provided 
“real” examples as opposed to reasons why some whites would not feel guilty.  This was 
done by computing a filter which excluded all participants who did not provide “real” 
examples as per the instructions.  Of the 100 participants who completed the items 
pertaining to the relevant variables, ten were excluded due to legitimising tendencies; 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
 None 7 7.0 7.2 
Gross Human 
Rights Violations 
14 14.0 14.4 
Dehumanisation 1 1.0 1.0 
Structural Violence 74 74.0 76.3 
Legitimising or 
Denial 
1 1.0 1.0 
Total 97 97.0 100.0 
Missing System 3 3.0  
Total 100 100.0  
 
 
61 
 
therefore only 90 participants were retained for inclusion in the final sample and therefore 
further analysis.  
Descriptive statistics 
Table 6 summarises the means, standard deviations and inter-correlations of the 
assessed variables namely reparation intention, manipulation check group-based guilt, 
manipulation check status loss, perceived responsibility, group-based guilt and in-group 
identification in Experiment 1.  
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Table 6.  Means, Standard Deviation and Intercorrelations of Principle Variables, Experiment 1 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Mean 2.52 4.94 2.78 2.72 3.09 2.98 
SD 0.77 2.47 2.13 0.86 1.08 0.67 
1 Reparation intention -      
2 Manipulation check guilt -.35** -     
3 Manipulation check status loss -.11 .03 -    
4 Perceived in-group 
responsibility 
.52*** -.20 -0.7 -   
5 Group-based guilt .34** -.14 .01 .35** -  
6 In-group identification  -.11 .27* .14 -.10 -.12 - 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Manipulation check for group-based guilt.  The manipulation check of group-
based guilt using the approach of (Schwarz et al., 1991) revealed that participants in the 
high group-based-guilt conditions (i.e., conditions where participants had to name three 
examples) reported significantly less difficulties to name examples (n = 50, M = 4.02, SD 
= 2.25)  than participants in the low group-based guilt conditions (i.e., conditions where 
participants had to name 12 examples) (n = 40, M = 6.10, SD = 2.26), F (1, 88) = 18.86, p 
= < .001, Eta squared = 0.176.  This result suggested that participants who had to name 
three examples found the recall process easier as opposed to participants who had to name 
12 examples.  These results suggest that the applied manipulation of the judgment bias 
was successful.  
Manipulation check for loss of status.  The manipulation check for status loss in 
the weak status loss conditions (n= 45, M = 2.56, SD = 2.12) and the strong status loss 
conditions (n= 45, M = 3.02, SD = 2.14) was not statistically significant, F (1, 88) = 1.08, 
p = .30, Eta squared = 0.0121. Since it cannot be concluded whether the manipulation of 
status loss or the manipulation check for status loss was effective and due to the fact that 
this status manipulation has not been used before, it was decided to continue with the data 
analysis.  
Hypothesis testing 
The hypothesis stated that the more participants perceived that they were losing 
status the less likely that they would react to group-based guilt with the intention to 
engage in reparative behaviour. In other words, participants will not react to group-based 
guilt with intentions to repair when they perceive that they have been losing status.  
Statistically we would therefore assume that participants in the high group-based guilt/ 
strong status loss condition should not differ in their intention to repair from participants 
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in the two low group-based guilt conditions.  However it was assumed that participants in 
the high group-based guilt/ weak status loss condition should score significantly higher on 
the intention to repair when compared to the other three conditions.   
  The hypothesis was tested using three planned contrasts in an ANOVA.  A 
planned contrast was conducted because the hypothesis was specific and developed prior 
to collecting data (Field, 2013). Planned contrasts break the “variation due to the 
experiment into component parts” (Field, 2013, p. 446).  In order to conduct a planned 
contrast, Field (2013) suggested that only two chunks of variation must be compared per 
contrast and once a group has been used in a contrast it cannot be used again.   
The first step in conducting the planned contrast, was to allocate weights to each 
experimental condition. Once weights were allocated, the total of the weights must equal 
zero (0).  The first planned contrast compared the high group-based guilt/weak status loss 
condition (weighted as -3), with the other three experimental conditions namely, high 
group-based guilt/ strong status loss (weighted as 1); low group-based guilt/weak status 
loss (weighted as 1); and low group-based guilt/strong status loss (weighted as 1) (e.g., -3 
+1+1+1= 0).  Contrast 1 predicted that the participants in the high group-based guilt/weak 
status loss condition will show more support for reparation than participants in the 
remaining conditions.  The second contrast, omitted the high group-based guilt/ weak 
status loss condition by allocating the weight of 0 (because this condition cannot be used 
in subsequent contrasts), however, it compared the high group-based guilt/strong status 
loss condition (weighted as -2) with low group-based guilt/ weak status loss (weighted as 
1) and low group-based guilt/ strong status loss conditions (weighted as 1).  There was no 
significant difference predicted for Contrast 2 (e.g., participants will not differ in their 
intention to engage in reparative behaviour).  The last planned contrast compared the 
remaining two groups namely, low group-based guilt/ weak status loss (weighted as -1) 
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condition with the low group-based guilt /strong status loss condition (weighted as 1).  
The high group-based guilt/weak status loss and high group-based guilt/ strong status loss 
conditions were both allocated with weights of zero (0) respectively.  Again no significant 
difference was predicted for Contrast 3 (e.g., participants will not differ in their intention 
to engage in reparative behaviour).   The prediction that contrast 1 should be significant 
whereas the remaining two contrasts should not be significant implies that participants in 
the high group-based guilt/ weak status loss condition should be indeed different from the 
participants in the high group-based guilt/ strong status loss; low group-based guilt/ weak 
status loss and low group-based guilt/ strong status loss conditions.  
Contrast 1. The first contrast revealed a statistically significant difference 
between participants in the high group-based guilt/ weak status loss condition (coded as -
3; n = 23, M = 2.85, SD = 0.82) (refer to Figure 1 below), as opposed to participants in the 
high group-based  guilt/strong status loss (coded as 1; n = 27, M = 2.57, SD = 0.77), low 
group-based guilt/ weak status loss (coded as 1; n = 22, M = 2.18, SD = 0.50) and low 
group-based guilt/ strong status loss (coded as 1; n = 18, M = 2.43, SD = 0.82) condition, t 
(86) = -2.54, p = .01, Eta squared = 0.070.  Consequently, the hypothesis could be 
confirmed.   
Contrast 2.   The second contrast indicated no significant differences between 
participants in the high group-based guilt/strong status loss condition (coded as -2; n = 27, 
M = 2.57, SD = 0.76) compared to the low group-based guilt/ weak status loss condition 
(coded as 1; n = 22, M = 2.18, SD = 0.50), and low group-based guilt/ strong status loss 
condition (coded as 1; n = 18, M = 2.43, SD = 0.82), t (86) = -1.44, p = .16, Eta squared = 
0.023. 
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Contrast 3.  The third contrast confirmed our assumption that participants in the 
low group-based guilt/ weak status loss (coded as -1; n = 22, M = 2.18, SD = 0.50), and 
low group-based guilt/ strong status loss (coded as 1; n = 18 M = 2.43, SD = 0.82), 
condition did not differ in their support for reparation, t (86) = 1.08, p = .29, Eta squared 
= 0.013. 
Figure 1: The means of Reparation across the four experimental conditions, 
Experiment 1 
 
 
Discussion   
The first experiment aimed to test the relationship between group-based guilt and 
reparation intention within the context of social change.  Specifically, it was hypothesised 
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that the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention becomes less 
significant when a loss of status is perceived.  The first experiment represented an initial 
attempt to experimentally manipulate an existing cognitive judgment bias (e.g., the ease 
of recall) as a means of indirectly measuring group-based guilt.  
Before any descriptive analyses were conducted, a content analysis was executed 
to determine what type of examples participants provided. A classification system was 
developed, based on literature pertaining to transgressions committed during apartheid.  
The classification codes were restricted to five categories due to the small sample size.  
Two independent raters, coded the various responses according to the classification 
system, where after the interrater reliabilities were conducted to determine agreement 
between the two raters (see Table, 2).  A frequency check revealed (see Table, 3, 4 and 5) 
that participants tended to choose examples that pertained to structural violence more 
often as opposed to other types of examples.  Therefore it is plausible that white born 
frees tend to associate apartheid with structural violence phenomena rather than more 
serious types of transgressions like gross human rights violations.  
Apartheid (in Afrikaans meaning to be apart or to be separate) refers to an 
institutionalised system of discrimination based on race, age or gender (see Lipton, 1989).  
To be apart is to be separated or segregated.  The terms “segregation” and 
“discrimination” mirror the type of examples some participants provided when asked to 
give examples of wrongdoings for which some white South Africans may feel guilty. 
Could it be that white born frees associate structural violence with apartheid because of 
the way apartheid is defined? It is understandable that information of more serious 
transgressions like killings with graphic photographs cannot be advertised on the internet 
or published in school text books because it would be very upsetting to a wide range of 
people. It therefore seems plausible that white born frees are protected in a way because 
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they may not be aware or have limited awareness regarding the types of atrocities that 
actually took place during apartheid.  However, it can only be stated for the purposes of 
this particular study that structural violence seems to be salient in the minds of white 
participants when they were asked to provide examples of wrongdoings. 
The content analysis also revealed that some participants tended to legitimise 
wrongdoings of in-group members when they were asked to provide examples of 
wrongdoings.  The tendency to legitimise other in-group members’ actions inhibits the 
experience of group-based guilt and its consequent behaviour (see Miron et al., 2006).  
Because the experience of group-based guilt was under investigation, it was decided to 
exclude participants who legitimised wrongdoings.   
The descriptive statistics (see Table 6) revealed that there was a significant 
correlation between perceived in-group responsibility and reparation intention; group-
based guilt and reparation intention as well as group-based guilt and perceived in-group 
responsibility.  Perceived in-group responsibility is an important pre-requisite for the 
experience of group-based guilt (Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011).  Without the acceptance of 
responsibility for transgression committed by fellow in-group members, the experience of 
group-based guilt becomes less relevant (Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011).  Once 
responsibility has been assumed for those harmful acts committed by fellow in-group 
members, an important condition for the experience of group-based guilt is fulfilled.   
There was no significant correlation between in-group identification and reparation 
intention; perceived responsibility as well as group-based guilt.  These findings are also in 
line with previous studies.  Research conducted by Doosje et al. (1998, Study 2) as well 
as Dumont and Waldzus (2014, Study 2) demonstrated that when the in-group’s history 
was portrayed as thoroughly negative, in-group identification did not correlate with 
group-based guilt, as opposed to when the in-group’ history was portrayed as ambiguous. 
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The manipulation check of group-based guilt revealed that participants who had to 
provide three examples of wrongdoings (high group-based guilt conditions) did find the 
recall task much easier than participants who had to provide 12 examples (low group-
based guilt conditions), who found the recall task much more difficult.  Therefore, the 
applied manipulation of the judgment bias was considered to be successful.  The applied 
manipulation check for status loss (strong and weak conditions) however, did not result in 
statistical significance.  Despite this result, the analysis was continued. 
The hypothesis was tested using three planned contrasts in an ANOVA.  In the 
first planned contrast, it was predicted that participants in the high group-based guilt/ 
weak status loss condition will show stronger reparation intentions compared to 
participants in the high group-based guilt/strong status loss; low group-based guilt/ weak 
status loss, and low group-based guilt/ strong status loss conditions.  In the second 
planned contrast it was predicted that there would be no significant differences between 
participants in the high group-based guilt/strong status loss condition compared to the low 
group-based guilt/ weak status loss condition and low group-based guilt/ strong status loss 
condition. In the third and final planned contrast, it was predicted that there would be no 
significant differences between participants in the low group-based guilt/ weak status loss 
condition compared to the low group-based guilt/ strong status loss condition.   
As predicted for Contrast 1, participants did differ in their reparation intentions.  
Therefore the results obtained in Experiment 1 provided empirical support for the 
hypothesis that the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention is 
moderated by perceived status loss.  This finding has implications for intergroup 
relationships, because reparation intentions will only be forthcoming if group-based guilt 
is experienced by in-group members whose status position remains unchanged.  This 
would imply that previous transgressor groups will only be prepared to pay reparation if 
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their dominant position is retained but would be less willing to do so when their dominant 
position is poised to change.   
The first experiment had various limitations.  First, the analysis did not indicate 
whether the manipulation of status loss or the manipulation check for status loss was 
effective.  The manipulation of status loss differed from the manipulation of the judgment 
bias (e.g., indirect measure of group-based guilt).  In both the weak and strong status loss 
conditions, participants had only to mention three examples of status decline or status rise 
as opposed to the 12 examples participants had to mention in the low group-based guilt 
conditions.  A second limitation was the small sample size.  Moreover, the sample was 
heterogeneous, and no controls were put in place regarding the socio-economic, political 
orientation, cultural and or educational background of the participants.  Lastly, the time it 
took participants to complete the questionnaire could not be controlled.  To overcome at 
least some of the outlined limitations a second experiment was conducted where the 
sample size was increased and the manipulation for loss of status was improved.   
Experiment 2 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 by 
improving the manipulation of and the manipulation check for status loss as well as by 
increasing the sample size.  Different to Experiment 1, the present experiment used only 
three experimental conditions namely high group-based guilt/weak status loss; high 
group-based guilt/ strong status loss, and low group-based guilt/ strong status loss.  The 
low group-based guilt/ weak status loss condition was not included because it would have 
unnecessarily reduced the sample size in the more relevant conditions of the study and 
thereby reduced power. 
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Similar to Experiment 1, the experiment was conducted using Qualtrics.  The 
target population was white South African undergraduate students registered at the 
University of South Africa in the social sciences (excluding students who opened the 
website for Experiment 1), economics-, and accounting finances departments.  Again, as 
in Experiment 1, only undergraduate students who were born after 1988, were invited to 
participate in the experiment.  Approval to conduct the study and the use of students as 
participants was granted by the Ethical Research Committee at the College of Graduate 
Studies as well as the Senate of Research and Innovation and Higher Degrees Committee 
at the University of South Africa.  The hypothesis remained the same as in Experiment 1, 
with the dependant variable comprising reparation intention and the two independent 
variables group-based guilt and perceived loss of status.   
Sample 
A total of 9306 emails were sent to white South African undergraduate social 
science students, registered at the University of South Africa.  A total of 902 students 
opened the webpage (9%) and 593 started the experiment (65.7%).  In total, 479 (80.8%) 
participants named examples in both manipulations (as requested), 53 participants (8.9%) 
named examples in only one manipulation; whereas 61 participants (10.3%) did not name 
any example. Of these 479 participants a total of 152 (31.7%) responded to items 
measuring the most relevant variables (e.g., reparation, group-based guilt and 
responsibility items) and 149 (31.1 %) completed all items in the questionnaire.  The final 
sample of 124 participants consisted of 41 (27.5%) white male participants and 108 
(72.5%) white female participants, ranging between the age of 18 to 28 (Mage = 22.38, SD 
= 2.37). The final sample was distributed to the three experimental conditions as outlined 
in Table 7.   
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Table 7. Number of participants in the three experimental conditions, respectively. 
S
ta
tu
s 
L
o
ss
 
 Group-based guilt 
  High Low 
 Strong  n = 50 n = 48 
 Weak  n = 26 not included 
 
Procedure 
Similar to Experiment 1, emails were sent to students which contained a link to 
the Qualtrics online survey.  Again by clicking on the link, the online survey was opened 
and participants were informed that the study is part of an international research project 
headed by the School of Interdisciplinary Research at the University of South Africa.  
Students were again requested to read the information carefully, if they intended to 
participate.  Similar to Experiment 1 the aim of the study was provided with the assurance 
there are no right or wrong answers.  The estimated time to complete the questionnaire 
was similar to Experiment 1.  Again, it was stipulated that participation is voluntary and 
confidentiality was ensured.  The anticipated risks of participating in the study were 
indicated as null and participants were informed that once data collection was completed 
there would be a lucky draw and one person could win the prize money of 1000 ZAR.  
Consent to participate in the study was indicated by clicking >>.   
Similar to Experiment 1, the manipulation of a judgment bias (e.g., indirect 
manipulation of group-based guilt), and status loss was followed by six items measuring 
reparation intention.  Again all items were presented in random order.  The manipulation 
check for group-based guilt was similar to Experiment 1, however, the manipulation 
check for status loss differed from the manipulation check used for status loss in 
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Experiment 1.  The manipulation for status loss was measured with the following 
question: “How difficult was it for you to generate the requested number of examples 
describing the decline of white South Africans?  Move the slider to indicate your answer”.  
The respective manipulation checks were followed by three items measuring perceived 
responsibility followed by four items measuring group-based guilt.  Similar to 
Experiment 1, participants were asked to indicate to which group they belong to followed 
by ten items measuring in-group identification.  Again, questions pertaining to gender, 
age, and country of residence as well as nationality were asked. Upon completion of the 
study, participants was debriefed and thanked. Similar to Experiment 1, anonymity and 
confidentiality was assured and participants were informed that the results would only be 
analysed at a group level for publication in a scientific journal.  As in Experiment 1, 
participants were requested to provide either an e-mail address or cell phone number if 
they wanted to participate in the lucky draw with the complete assurance that the 
information would not be stored and only be used to contact the winner of the lucky draw.  
Participants could exit the survey by clicking on >>. 
Manipulation of the independent variables: group-based guilt and status   
As in Experiment 1, the conditions of group-based guilt (high versus low) were 
manipulated, based on research conducted by Schwarz et al. (1991).  However, the 
manipulation of the status loss conditions (strong versus weak) differed from the 
procedure used in Experiment 1.  It was decided to apply the Schwartz et al. (1991) 
approach in manipulating status loss as was done to manipulate the judgment bias (e.g. 
ask participants to describe three examples of white South Africans’ decline in the weak 
status loss condition and 12 examples of white South Africans’ decline in the strong 
status loss condition).   
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Manipulation of the guilt conditions: high versus low group-based guilt.  In 
both the high and low group-based guilt conditions, participants again were provided with 
the following information: “Take a minute and think about the apartheid period in South 
Africa. Think about the various transgressions white South Africans committed toward 
black South Africans during this period. For these transgressions some white South 
Africans feel guilt. Please briefly describe three (3) [twelve (12)] examples of these 
wrongdoings for which white South Africans may feel guilt, even if they were not 
necessarily individually involved”.  
Directly below this information, participants were provided with three text boxes 
labelled Wrongdoing 1, Wrongdoing 2 and Wrongdoing 3, where the participants could 
type in their examples (e.g., high group-based guilt conditions).  However in the low 
group-based guilt conditions, participants were asked to provide twelve (12) examples in 
the text boxes labelled Wrongdoing 1, Wrongdoing 2, Wrongdoing 3, Wrongdoing 4, etc. 
Manipulation of the status conditions: strong versus weak status loss.  In the 
strong status loss conditions participants were provided with the following information: 
“Apartheid was demolished 20 years ago when South Africa held its first-ever free and 
democratic elections. A lot has happened since then. South Africa has developed into a 
country that won the Rugby World Cup in 1995, that successfully hosted the Soccer 
World Cup in 2010, and that became a favourite holiday destination for people from all 
over the world. 
Most obviously, the relationship between white and black South Africans changed 
over the last 20 years. White and black South Africans use the same public facilities and 
spaces, they work in the same jobs, and they buy properties in the same suburbs. With all 
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these changes there are areas in which the standing of white South Africans has been 
declining. Please briefly describe three (3) examples of the white South Africans’ decline”.  
Directly below this information, participants were provided with three text boxes 
labelled Example 1, Example 2 and Example 3, where the participants could type in their 
examples. 
Regarding the perceived weak status loss conditions, participants were provided 
with exactly the same information as in the perceived strong status loss conditions, but 
participants were asked to provide 12 examples in twelve text boxes labelled Example 1, 
Example 2, Example 3, etc. 
Measurements   
Similar to Experiment 1, the measurements of Experiment 2 were presented on a 
5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Only the 
manipulation checks regarding group-based guilt and status loss was presented on a 10 
point slider ranging from 1 (very easy) to 10 (very difficult).   
Reparation intention (alpha = .82), perceived responsibility (alpha =. 74); group-
based guilt (alpha = .88) and in-group identification (alpha = .86) were measured in the 
exact same way as in Experiment 1.  
Manipulation Checks of the Independent Variables 
The manipulation check for group-based guilt was similar to the manipulation 
check used in Experiment 1. The status loss manipulation however differed from 
Experiment 1 and was tested by posing the question: “How difficult was it for you to 
generate the requested number of examples describing the decline of white South 
Africans?  Move the slider to indicate your answer”.  Again a slider was provided and 
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participants were instructed to position themselves on the slider ranging from 1 (very 
easy) to 10 (very difficult). 
Results 
Preliminary Analysis 
As in Experiment 1, in the first step of the preliminary analysis of Experiment 2 a 
content analysis was conducted to determine what type of examples participants provided 
when requested to name three [12] wrongdoings for which white South Africans may feel 
guilt.  As in Experiment 1, participants could write any examples in the textboxes 
provided.  In order to determine what type of wrongdoings white “born frees” associated 
with apartheid, two independent raters coded the responses according to the classification 
system that was used in Experiment 1.  The classification system included the same 
categories: gross human rights violations, dehumanisation, structural violence, 
legitimising or denial and finally none.  Again two raters were blind to the three 
experimental conditions.  Responses that were characterised as ambiguous were discussed 
until agreement was reached.  Again the Kappas were computed to determine the inter-
rater reliabilities.  The results for the interrater reliabilities are summarised in Table 8. 
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Table 8.  Interrater reliabilities of Experiment 2  
Wrongdoing Examples Interrater Reliability 
Wrongdoing example 1 Kappa = .770, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 2 Kappa = .738, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 3 Kappa = .713, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 4 Kappa = .838, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 5 Kappa = .713, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 6 Kappa = .757, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 7 Kappa = .760, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 8 Kappa = .651, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 9 Kappa = .752, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 10 Kappa = .718, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 11 Kappa = .843, p < .001 
Wrongdoing example 12 Kappa = .716, p < .001 
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The first three examples that participants provided (see Table 9, 10 and 11 below), 
across the different conditions, again revealed that participants tended to choose examples 
that reflected structural violence more often as opposed to the other types of 
transgressions.   
Table 9.  Frequency of categories: first example, Experiment 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10.  Frequency of categories: second example, Experiment 2 
 
 
 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
 None 5 3.3 3.4 
Gross Human 
Rights Violations 
20 13.2 13.4 
Dehumanisation 13 8.6 8.7 
Structural Violence 105 69.1 70.5 
Legitimisation or 
Denial 
6 3.9 4.0 
Total 149 98.0 100.0 
Missing System 3 2.0  
Total 152 100.0  
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
 
 None 6 3.9 4.1  
Gross Human Rights 
Violations 
23 15.1 15.8  
Dehumanisation 11 7.2 7.5  
Structural Violence 102 67.1 69.9  
Legitimisation or 
Denial 
4 2.6 2.7  
Total 146 96.1 100.0  
Missing System 6 3.9   
Total 152 100.0   
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Table 11.  Frequency of categories: third example, Experiment 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar to Experiment 1, the Pearson Chi-Square tests revealed that the type of 
examples did not differ significantly across the different conditions (first example of 
wrongdoing: Chi- Square value = 5.483, df = 8, p = .705; second example of wrongdoing: 
Chi-Square value = 5.244, df = 8, p = .731; third example of wrongdoing: Chi-Square 
value = 3.284, df = 8, p = .915).   
As in Experiment 1, some participants provided examples that were classified as 
either legitimisation or none (see Table 9, 10 and 11) and those participants (by filtering 
them out) were excluded from further analysis because they did not provide “real” 
examples for transgressions for which some white South Africans may feel guilt.  Of the 
152 participants who answered all items pertaining to the relevant variables (e.g. 
reparation intention, perceived responsibility and group-based guilt), 28 participants were 
excluded from further analysis because of the tendency to provide examples that either 
legitimised the in-groups’ behaviour or were classified as having nothing to do with 
apartheid.  Consequently, a total of 124 participants were retained for further analysis.   
 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
 None 5 3.3 3.6 
Gross Human 
Rights Violations 
11 7.2 8.0 
Dehumanisation 8 5.3 5.8 
Structural Violence 107 70.4 77.5 
Legitimisation or 
Denial 
7 4.6 5.1 
Total 138 90.8 100.0 
Missing System 14 9.2  
Total 152 100.0  
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Descriptive statistics 
Table 12 summarises the means, standard deviations and inter-correlations of the 
assessed variables namely reparation intention, manipulation check group-based guilt, 
manipulation check status loss, perceived responsibility, group-based guilt and in-group 
identification in Experiment 2.    
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Table 12.  Means, Standard Deviation and Intercorrelations of Principle Variables, Experiment 2 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Mean 2.43 5.21 5.02 2.71 3.18 3.09 
SD 0.81 2.34 2.86 0.85 0.99 0.69 
1 Reparation intention -      
2 Manipulation check guilt -.11 -     
3 Manipulation check status loss .06 .26** -    
4 Perceived in-group 
responsibility 
.54** -.07 -.09 -   
5 Group-based guilt .43** -.04 -.14 .47** -  
6 In-group identification  -.05 .13 .01 -.00 -.05 - 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
82 
 
Manipulation check for group-based guilt 
The manipulation check for group-based guilt revealed that participants in the 
high group-based guilt conditions (conditions where participants had to name three 
examples) (n = 76, M = 5.05, SD = 2.35) reported less difficulties to name examples than 
participants in the low group-based guilt condition (conditions where participants had to 
name 12 examples) (n = 48, M = 5.46, SD = 2.33).  However, this difference did not reach 
statistical significance, F (1, 123) = 0.88, p = .35, Eta squared = 0.0079.  
The descriptive statistics indicated that the two manipulation checks correlated 
with each other (see Table 12).  Given that the manipulation of group-based guilt was 
immediately followed by the manipulation of status loss, it might be the case that 
participants have misattributed difficulties experienced in the guilt manipulation to the 
task of the status manipulation when reporting their difficulties in naming the required 
number of wrongdoings.  
The manipulation check was therefore repeated for the guilt manipulation but this 
time by controlling for the manipulation check for status loss as a covariate (using GLM). 
The results showed that the manipulation check for status loss had a direct effect on the 
manipulation check for group-based guilt, (strong status loss condition: n = 98, M = 4.48, 
SD = 2.79), (weak status loss condition: n = 26, M = 7.08, SD = 2.13), F (1,123) = 10.89, 
p < .001, Partial Eta squared = .083.  Moreover, the difference of how easily participants 
experienced the naming of examples in the high group-based-guilt conditions (conditions 
where participants had to name three examples), (n = 76, M = 5.05, SD = 2.35) and in the 
low group-based guilt condition (conditions where participants had to name 12 
examples), (n = 48, M = 5.46, SD = 2.33), reached in the analysis a marginal significant 
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effect, F (1, 123) = 2.95, p = .088, Partial Eta squared = .024.  The trend of this result 
supports the reasoning about the findings of the manipulation check as outlined above. 
Manipulation check for perceived status loss 
The manipulation check of status loss revealed that participants in the strong 
status loss conditions (conditions where participants had to name three examples) (n = 98, 
M = 4.48, SD = 2.79) reported less difficulties to name examples than participants in the 
weak status loss condition (conditions where participants had to name 12 examples) (n = 
26, M = 7.08, SD = 2.13).  This difference did reach statistical significance, F (1, 123) = 
19.43, p = .000, Eta squared = 0.137.  
Hypothesis testing 
The hypothesis was the same as in Experiment 1, that is to say, the relationship 
between group-based guilt and reparation intention will become less significant if in-
group members perceive a loss of status (i.e. participants in the high group-based 
guilt/weak status loss condition will show more reparation intentions than participants in 
the remaining conditions).  As in Experiment 1, the hypothesis was tested, however, using 
two planned contrasts in an ANOVA (because there were only three experimental 
conditions).  The first planned contrast compared the high group-based guilt/weak status 
loss condition (weighted as -2) with the other two experimental conditions namely, high 
group-based guilt/ strong status loss (weighted as 1) and low group-based guilt/strong 
status loss (weighted as 1).  The second contrast compared the high group-based 
guilt/strong status loss condition (weighted as -1) with the low group-based guilt/ strong 
status loss condition (weighted as 1).  There was no significant difference predicted for 
Contrast 2.  
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Contrast 1.  Contrast 1 revealed that participants in the high group-based guilt/ 
weak status loss condition (coded – 2, n = 26, M = 2.50, SD = 1.03), high group-based 
guilt/strong status loss (coded 1, n = 50, M = 2.25, SD = 0.72), and low group-based guilt/ 
strong status loss condition (coded 1, n = 48, M = 2.56, SD = 0.74) did not differ in their 
reparation intentions, t (121) = -0.51, p = .611, Eta Squared = 0.002. 
Contrast 2.  The second contrast indicated no significant differences between 
participants in the high group-based guilt/strong status loss condition (coded as -1; n = 50, 
M = 2.25, SD = 0.72) compared to the low group-based guilt/ strong status loss condition 
(coded as 1; n = 48, M = 2.56, SD = 0.74, t (121) = 1.88, p = .062, Eta Squared = 0.001). 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 by using a larger 
sample size.  Moreover, Experiment 2 aimed to improve the manipulation for status loss 
as well as the manipulation check for status loss.  As in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 
manipulated an existing cognitive judgment bias (e.g., the ease/difficulty of recalling 
information) as a means of indirectly measuring group-based guilt.  In the high group-
based guilt condition, participants were asked to describe three examples of wrongdoings 
for which some white South Africans may feel guilty for as opposed to providing 12 
examples of wrongdoings in the low group-based guilt condition.  The status loss 
manipulation differed from the approach used in Experiment 1.  The approach that was 
used to manipulate the ease of recall (e.g., approach by Schwartz et al., 1991) as an 
indirect measure of group-based guilt was also applied in the manipulation of status loss.  
In the strong status loss condition, participants were asked to provide three examples of 
white South Africans’ status decline.  In the weak status loss condition, participants were 
requested to provide 12 examples of white South Africans status decline. 
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A content analysis was conducted as part of the preliminary analysis to ascertain 
what types of examples participants gave when asked to think about the various 
transgressions for which some white South Africans may feel guilt.  Again and similar to 
Experiment 1, the majority of examples pertained to structural violence.  Replicating the 
findings in Experiment 1, it was revealed that some participants did not provide “real” 
examples as per the instructions but instead provided examples that pertained to 
legitimising the in-group’s behaviour.    
The descriptive statistics indicated significant correlations between perceived in-
group responsibility and reparation intention; group-based guilt and reparation intention 
as well as group-based guilt and perceived in-group responsibility as found in Experiment 
1 (see Table 12).  Again, these findings coincide with previous studies which have 
demonstrated the significant relationship between responsibility, group-based guilt and 
reparation (see Doosje et al., 1998, 2006; Dumont & Waldzus, 2014). There was no 
significant correlation between in-group identification and reparation intention; - and 
responsibility as well as between in-group identification and group-based guilt.  Again, 
these findings are in line with previous studies where in-group identification did not 
correlate with group-based guilt, responsibility or reparation under conditions where the 
in-groups’ behaviour was portrayed as thoroughly negative (Doosje et al., 1998, Study 2; 
Dumont & Waldzus, 2014, Study 2).   
The results of the manipulation check for group-based guilt, however, was not 
significant.  Although speculative, the ineffectiveness of the manipulation check could be 
due to a recency effect.  Ebbinghaus (1987/1964) documented the serial position effect 
which pertained to how the position of an item can affect recall.  The recency effect 
which is one of two main concepts in the serial position effect, pertains to a tendency, 
when asked to recall information that was presented in order, to start with the last items 
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that were presented on the list. The reason for this is because the most recent information 
is embedded in the short term-memory (Ebbinghaus, 1987/1964).    
Again, albeit speculative, the ineffectiveness of the manipulation check could also 
be due to the misattribution of memory where an idea is erroneously misattributed to the 
wrong source (Schacter, 2001).  In other words, it is possible, that when participants were 
asked to rate the difficulty they experienced to generate the requested number of 
wrongdoings, they may have misattributed the difficulty to the manipulation of status loss 
instead of the manipulation of the judgement bias related to group-based guilt (e.g., 
indirect manipulation of group-based guilt). 
The hypothesis, which stated that the relationship between group-based guilt and 
reparation intention is moderated by social change, was tested using two planned 
contrasts in an ANOVA.  In the first planned contrast, it was predicted that participants in 
the high group-based guilt/ weak status loss condition will show stronger reparation 
intentions than participants in the high group-based guilt/strong status loss and low group-
based guilt/ strong status loss conditions.  In the second planned contrast it was predicted 
that there would be no significant differences between participants in the high group-
based guilt/strong status loss condition compared to the low group-based guilt/ strong 
status loss condition.  Unexpectedly and in contrast to the prediction for Contrast 1, 
participants did not differ in their intention to repair.  Although, the mean values for 
reparation intentions for the high group-based guilt/weak status loss and high group-based 
guilt/strong status loss conditions pointed in the expected direction (excluding the low 
group-based guilt strong status loss condition), the differences did not reach statistical 
significance in Contrast 1. Therefore the hypothesis could not be confirmed.   
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The aim of Experiment 2 was to improve the manipulation for status loss as well 
as the manipulation check for status loss and to increase the sample size.  Both the 
conditions for group-based guilt (high versus low) and status loss (strong versus weak), 
were manipulated by using the approach of Schwarz et al. (1991).   However, the 
application of this approach (e.g., applying the same principles) on both manipulations 
and in succession did not seem to be effective.  It therefore seems plausible, yet 
speculative, that the use of this approach may be restrictive in that it can only be used 
once and not repeatedly.  The reason for this could be due to a possibility that participants 
experienced a cognitive overload.  Research by Miller (1956) on information processing 
indicated that short-term memory can only accommodate a certain amount of elements at 
any given time.  Since the recency effect, affect short term memory, it seems plausible 
that the short-term memory was extended well beyond the capabilities of the participants 
(because of all the examples that participants had to provide).   
As in Experiment 1, another limitation could be the small sample size itself.  Of 
the 9 306 e-mails that were sent to white South African undergraduate social science 
students, only 152 participants completed all the items pertaining to the relevant 
variables.  This number dropped further to 124 participants after some participants were 
filtered out because of legitimising tendencies and the provision of examples that had 
nothing to do with Apartheid.  Based on this, it could be that the study did not have 
enough statistical power.   
General Discussion 
The objective of this research was to test the assumption experimentally that the 
relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention is moderated by social 
change.  This hypothesis was tested in two experiments.  Experiment 1 indeed confirmed 
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that the relationship between group-based guilt and the intention to repair becomes less 
significant within a context of social change.  It can therefore be stated with caution, that 
social change does seem to moderate the relationship between group-based guilt and 
reparation intention.  However, the same hypothesis could not be experimentally 
confirmed in Experiment 2, due to methodological issues (i.e., indirect manipulation for 
group-based guilt was ineffective).   
In order to engage in reparative behaviour there must be a pervasive sense of 
group-based guilt. It is, however, important to note that the overall mean score of 
reparation intention was significantly below the midpoint (on a scale from 1 to 5) which 
indicates that regardless of whether participants experienced high or low group-based 
guilt or experienced weak or strong status loss they tend to rather reject reparation 
intentions (see Dumont & Waldzus, 2014; see Leach et al., 2013).  It could be that 
participants did not discriminate between degrees of status loss (e.g., weak or strong), but 
rather viewed status loss in general as a loss period which coincides with the notion of 
Norton and Sommers (2011) in that intergroup relations are perceived as a zero-sum 
game, where advances for the one group means losses for the other group. In other words, 
if my group loses it means your group gains.  In this instance why should I support 
reparation, when my group has already paid?  There is no denying that white South 
Africans perceive a loss of status as opposed to black South Africans who perceive a gain 
in status position (Dumont & Waldzus, 2014).  A perceived loss of status is perceived as 
threatening to the in-group, which could result in greater resistance to promote intentions 
aimed at reparation (see Nadler & Halabi, 2006). 
Could the resistance by in-group members to support reparation intention be due 
to perceptions of illegitimacy or legitimacy regarding their status position?  In 1990 when 
the Nationalist Party entered into negotiations with the African National Congress, the 
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results thereof culminated in the birth of democracy when all South Africans irrespective 
of race exercised their right to vote.  Just a day before the elections the white minority 
enjoyed political power and a day later the black majority secured the political power.  
There was no collective struggle on the part of the dominant in-group to protect their 
political resources.  The reason for this could be because the status position of the white 
dominant in-group, at that time, was perceived to be objectively illegitimate.  Consistent 
with Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) when the status hierarchy is 
perceived to be objectively illegitimate, high status in-group members will not engage in 
collective action.  Under the condition of perceived illegitimacy concerning the status 
position of the in-group, the said group will be more inclined to discuss differences in 
status positions as well as commonalities in order to enhance moral concerns (Saguy & 
Dovidio, 2013).  However, all the dramatic changes that have been implemented since the 
fall of apartheid aimed to eradicate inequality (e.g., job reservation policies for previously 
disadvantages groups in an economy that has a scarce amount of jobs available, changing 
street names, changing public holidays – 16 December, land claims and not funding 
children’s homes if the majority is not from designated group to name a few), could be 
perceived as extremely threatening by white South Africans.  These threats may be 
interpreted as attempts to marginalise the minority.   
According to Scheepers and Ellemers (2005, p. 193) status hierarchies “are 
inherently unstable” and high status in-group members should be aware of the possibility 
for changes in the status position.  Saguy and Dovidio (2013) indicated that under 
conditions of instability, talking about status differences can result in the re-legitimisation 
of the in-group’s status position.  Is it possible that after 20 years of democracy in South 
Africa, white South Africans are re-legitimising their position because they might feel 
that they are in the process of paying or have already paid enough (e.g., due to dramatic 
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changes)? Research conducted in the South African context by de la Sablonniere et al. 
(2013), indicated that the trajectory of status change is characterised by stability.  
However, in that particular study, the trajectory of status change regarding political power 
was not measured.  It seems plausible that if political power was included in the study, the 
trajectory of status change could have indicated instability. Under conditions of instability 
and perceived legitimacy of the in-groups status position, in-group members will be less 
inclined to discuss intergroup commonalities or differences in status (Saguy & Dovidio, 
2013).  This would then explain why white participants are less inclined to engage in 
reparative behaviour.  Perceptions that the status position is declining coupled with 
beliefs of legitimacy, may result in enhanced discriminatory behaviour against the out-
group.   
The results of both these studies, indicated that participants experienced group-
based guilt. The experience of group-based guilt is negative in nature with psychological 
costs involved and attempts to alleviate this feeling will be engaged in (Wohl et al., 
2006); especially those high in-group identifiers who value their social identity.  A 
strategy that could be employed to downplay the severity of the transgression is to admit 
to only part of the transgression rather than providing a full disclosure (Peer, Acquisti, & 
Shalvi, 2014). To admit to only a small part of the transgression  is to minimise the social 
cost thereof (in other words, you look like a morally upstanding person because not only 
did you take responsibility, you were honest about it too and you feel much better about 
doing a bad thing).  Partial confessions could be reflected in the type of examples 
participants gave when they were instructed to provide examples for wrongdoings for 
which some South Africans may feel guilty.  Providing structural violence examples (like 
the majority of the participants did as evident in the content analysis) like 
“discrimination” and “inequality” looks much better from a moral standpoint as opposed 
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to full confessions like being associated with a system that not only illegitimately 
benefited the in-group unfairly but also endorsed the systematic violence and killing of 
innocent people based on the colour of their skin. Providing partial confessions to 
transgressions serves a protective function when one considers the attributions made for 
the negative behaviour of the in-group.  In line with the self-serving attribution bias, the 
negative behaviour of in-group members toward out-group members could be attributed 
to external factors (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003).  This tendency protects the social 
identity of the in-group, especially those in-group members who identify highly with the 
in-group. If negative in-group behaviour is attributed to external factors, it implies that 
those external factors are not stable and fixed and therefore not associated with an 
essentialist view of the in-group (Morton et al., 2009).  Therefore it seems plausible that 
white participants may engage in exonerating thoughts regarding the in-groups’ 
behaviour.   Again, how can historic behaviour be under the control of present day in-
group members?  Lickel et al. (2004) stated that present day in-group members can 
exercise control over current day behaviour by engaging in reparations. 
In an attempt to protect the shared identity and keep the positive distinctiveness of 
the group intact, high in-group identifiers will perceive the in-group as more variable 
when presented with negative information thereby assigning the blame to a few deviant 
group members (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003).  Regarding the cost of being a member of 
the high status in-group in present times seems to be a dichotomy in itself.  The majority 
of group members in Experiment 1 and 2, neither agreed nor disagreed with regard to in-
group identification (as indicated by the means which were 2.99 and 3.09, respectively).  
This could reflect two tendencies. On the one hand, white participants do not want to 
indicate that they identify less with their in-group because in doing so they will be 
perceived as traitors to their group (e.g., white South Africans).  On the other hand, white 
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participants do not want to overtly identify with the in-group because it would imply that 
they are indeed part of a group who did something bad.   
Another factor that must be taken into account is the cost of reparation itself. 
Schmitt et al. (2004) indicated that if the cost of reparation is too high and the attainment 
thereof exceeds the effort, it might result in lessened experience of group-based guilt.  
Perhaps the costs of reparation just seem too high a price to pay for white participants.  If 
the functionality of group-based guilt is limited, as alluded to by McGarty et al. (2005), 
could it be possible that other avenues are more likely to motivate group members to 
redistribute power and status privileges?  Given that reparation is only supported if the 
status position of the dominant group remains unchanged, it would mean that reparation is 
associated with economic inequality.  Could it therefore be that status position (e.g., 
dominant) is a better predictor for reparation intentions, rather than group-based guilt? 
Future research to this effect could answer this question.  
Despite the limited practical implications of this effort, the present research does 
contribute to existing research.  The first contribution pertains to research on forgiveness.  
The intention to engage in reparative behaviour is only a first step in the long and 
complicated process to forgiveness.  The need and importance for reparative behaviour to 
restore a damaged intergroup relationship cannot be emphasised enough.  However, 
within a context of social change, reparation intention has consequences for intergroup 
forgiveness in that reparation seems to be dependent on financial stability (see Dumont & 
Waldzus, 2014).  If individuals perceive that their in-group status position is threatened 
(e.g., perceived economic threat) there could be a diminished intent to repair a damaged 
intergroup relationship.  As a result the road to forgiveness is barred without a first step 
having ever been taken.  
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A second contribution pertains to the understanding of reparation intention in 
contexts of social change.  The lack of reparation intentions within social change contexts 
does not only impact on the future of intergroup relations but also suggests a particular – 
if not limited understanding of reparation.  Reparation is not only about money, but also 
about rehabilitation, forgiveness and the promise of non-repetition.  As Ibekwe (1993, p. 
3) stated, that “money is not even one per cent of what reparation is about. Reparation is 
mostly about making repairs. Self-made repairs, on ourselves: mental repairs, 
psychological repairs, cultural repairs, organisational repairs, social repairs, institutional 
repairs, technological repairs, economic repairs, political repairs, educational repairs, 
repairs of every type …”.  Phillips (2014) continued in the same vein, and indicated that 
reparation aims to atone for transgressions committed in the hope of restoring morality in 
intergroup relations.  Phillips (2014) elucidated that the legal process of reparation 
demands the following from the group that committed the transgression (including the 
beneficiaries of the said group): 1. an apology, 2. acknowledgement of wrongdoing, 3. 
commitment to repair and 4. Commitment to non-repetition.   However, further research 
could expand on how reparation intention is defined in contexts where social change is 
taking place. 
A third contribution pertains to how white South Africans must engage with their 
history to facilitate reconciliation.  It seems evident that some white South African 
students born after 1988 and registered with the University of South Africa tend to engage 
in legitimising behaviour when asked to provide examples of transgressions for which 
some white South Africans may feel guilty.  Similarly, Smillie and Hosken (2014) 
reported in an article titled “SA forgetting its history”, comments made by Kim Wale that 
young white South Africans (when asked about apartheid) tended to be defensive in their 
responses.  The authors stated that according to Wale (project leader of SA Reconciliation 
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Barometer) the reason behind this phenomenon could be due to how history is being 
taught in schools.  It is  important to assist the born-free generation of South Africa to 
critically engage in its history (although difficult) because the opposite would mean 
forgetting and amnesia which tend to encourage denial that could result in repeating the 
mistakes of the past (ergo no reconciliation).   
Finally, another contribution, from a methodological point of view, seems to be 
the efficacy of the approach of Schwartz et al. (1991).  Although limited, there does seem 
to be value in manipulating a judgment bias as an indirect way of manipulating group-
based guilt in contexts where social change is taking place.  The application of this 
particular approach in other intergroup contexts could be elucidated. 
The limitations of this research included the small sample sizes in both 
experiments as well as the ineffectiveness pertaining to the manipulation for status loss 
and manipulation check for status loss in Experiment 1. Another limitation involved the 
high attrition rate of participants (i.e., the ratio between participants who started the study 
and those who finished the study) which might have impacted the sample and the actual 
responses. Although the latter remains speculation the former expresses itself in the 
gender bias found in both experiments.  In Experiment 1, there was only eight males 
which represented 9% of the sample with 41 (27.5%) white males in Experiment 2.  
These figures made gender comparisons impossible.  Other phenomena that may have 
confounded the results, was the tendency of some participants not to follow instructions.  
The results in the content analysis indicated that some participants did not provide 
examples as per instructions but rather tended to legitimise the in-group’s behaviour.  
Other participants, however, preferred to provide examples that had nothing to do with 
apartheid.  Could legitimising tendencies be a possible reason for the low scores obtained 
for group-based guilt in other studies (see Harth et al., 2008; see Iyer et al., 2004)?  
 
 
95 
 
Intergroup forgiveness is associated with legitimising actions.  If out-group members 
forgave the in-group for their transgressions, then the in-group will not need to legitimise 
wrongdoing (see Cehajic et al., 2009).  Indeed, some participants did legitimise in-group 
behaviour rather than provide examples of wrongdoings.  This may be an indicator that 
white participants perceive that they are not forgiven despite perceived reparations being 
paid (e.g., affirmative action, university admittance reflects the population distribution 
and therefore we are paying).  
To replicate both the studies by improving the indicated limitations is beyond the 
scope of this thesis but it would be worthwhile to investigate.  Other limitations included 
the studies being internet-based which contributed to the low control of the experimental 
context.  That being said the results found in both studies are not less valid.  Although the 
results of Experiment 1 cannot be generalised to other contexts, new studies can be 
undertaken within other contexts at an attempt to triangulate. 
The results of Experiment 1 together with correlational evidence as presented by 
Dumont and Waldzus (2014), points to the role that perceived status loss plays in the 
relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention. It seems that context 
does in fact play a role when the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation 
intention is considered.  Therefore, with caution it is stated that perhaps the role of status 
loss can be considered in the discussion of group-based guilt and the intention to repair 
regarding reconciliation politics in South Africa.  
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